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INTRODUCTION

The prevalence in modem society of widely diffused wrongs committed by the
transmission of information, whether by traditional means or over the Internet,' has
placed increasing strain on traditional concepts of personal jurisdiction. While the
Supreme Court has stayed above the fray, lower federal and state courts struggle to
apply older formulations in new contexts. The problems are varied and difficult,
leading to closely divided opinions and debatable results and raising new issues of
appropriate limits on the sovereign power of the states and fairness to the parties.
Consider, for example, the decision of the California Supreme Court in Pavlovich v.
SuperiorCourt,2 in which the court divided four-to-three on the question of whether a
Texas Web site operator who had posted software designed to defeat the plaintiff's
technology for encrypting copyrighted motion pictures was subject to personal
jurisdiction in California where the motion picture, computer, and DVD industries
were centered. In rejecting jurisdiction, the majority focused on the fact that the
defendant did not know that the particular plaintiff, a licensing entity created by the
motion picture and DVD industries, was located there.3 The dissenters thought it
sufficient that the defendant was on notice that its conduct would harm the motion
picture and DVD industries centered in California. 4 Or consider the Ninth Circuit's
recent, divided opinion in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L 'Antisemitsme,5 where the majority rejected jurisdiction in California in an action by a
California Internet service provider seeking a declaration that a French court order
requiring the plaintiff to block French citizens' access to Nazi material displayed on
plaintiff's Web site violated the First Amendment. The dissenting judge would have
upheld jurisdiction on the ground that the defendants knew that their conduct would
have a "powerful and potentially devastating impact" on the plaintiff in California,
requiring it to alter its servers there under pain of severe penalties.
Courts confronting these and similarly difficult issues of personal jurisdiction in the
context of actions for defamation, copyright infringement, unfair competition, and
other wrongs having potentially widely dispersed effects have evidenced considerable
confusion over what jurisdictional test should be applied in such cases and over the
proper interpretation of those tests in new contexts with which they were not designed
to deal. In particular, the courts have struggled with the meaning of the Supreme
Court's "purposeful availment" test, originally developed in the context of contract and
product liability disputes arising from the conduct of interstate business, 7 and of the

1. The harmful effects of such wrongs typically are intangible or financial rather than
physical. Examples include defamation, copyright and trademark infringement, and unfair
competition.
2. 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
3. Id. at 11-12.
4. Id. at 13, 20-25 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
5. 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
6. Id. at 1134.
7. See, e.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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"effects" test developed by the Supreme Court in the context of intentionally tortious
activity committed in one state but having effects in another.8 They also have
evidenced uncertainty regarding the relationship between these two apparently distinct
tests for personal jurisdiction. In the specific context of Internet activities, the courts
sometimes have relied on new interpretations of one or the other of these established
approaches to questions of personal jurisdiction, and sometimes have fashioned new
tests not dependent upon either of them.
Most recent literature in this area has focused on whether the commission of wrongs
by the transmission of information over the omnipresent Internet should give rise to
unique tests for personal jurisdiction and, if so, what those tests should be. 9 Our focus

8. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
9. Some commentators have argued that current personal jurisdiction law is not suited to
deal with the Internet. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real
World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197 (1995); Martin H.
Redish, OfNew Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the Nature of
Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575 (1998). Others contend that current
jurisdictional doctrine can be adapted to deal with the Internet. See Allan R. Stein, The
Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT'L LAw. 1167 (1998); Mary
Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. Cmn. LEGAL
F. 171 (2001) (arguing that we should maintain our jurisdictional framework despite the
problems brought by the Internet). The problem has generated considerable academic
commentary. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 473,474, 492 (2004) (focusing on the
confluence of Internet jurisdiction and libel jurisdiction and concluding that the consequence

has been "inconsistency in result and uncertainty in application" and that the best solution
would be state or federal legislation); Joseph S. Bums & Richard A. Bales, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Web, 3 ME. L. REv. 29, 31-32 (2001) (summarizing the "spider web"
approach to personal jurisdiction over the Internet, where "the operator of a Web site is deemed
to be jurisdictionally 'present' at every location from which her site is accessed" and the
"highway approach, [under which] the operator of a Web site is jurisdictionally present in a

foreign state only if the operator has somehow 'reached out' to a person or entity in the foreign
state, such as by soliciting information from or selling a product over the Web to a person or
entity in the foreign state"); Mark C. Dearing, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Can the
Traditional Principles and Landmark Cases Guide the Legal System into the 21st Century?, 4 J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y 819 (1999); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network
Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 493,494
(2004) (proposing a "Trusted Systems" approach to Internet personal jurisdiction issues that
addresses the "flaws of previous Internet-specific jurisdictional frameworks" by providing

"firmer grounding" in traditional jurisdiction doctrine and minimum contacts analysis "for the
future evolution ofjurisdiction precedent in cases involving alleged harms arising out of new
media"); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and "Purposeful Availment": A Reassessment of
Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 455 (2004) (discussing the

implications of current personal jurisdiction doctrine as it impacts sovereignty considerations);
Richard Philip Rollo, The Morass ofInternet Personal Jurisdiction: It Is Time for a Paradigm
Shift, 51 FLA. L. REv. 667 (1999); Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing
Due Process Through the Lens ofRegulatory Precision, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 411,411-13 (2004)
[hereinafter Stein, Regulatory Precision] (pointing out that although the Internet has increased
the "quantity" ofjurisdictional occurrences, "it has not created problems that are qualitatively

more difficult" and arguing that personal jurisdiction in cases involving Internet activities
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is broader: do the problems that courts have experienced in dealing with issues of
personal jurisdiction in new contexts require new and separate jurisdictional tests, or,
in cases where jurisdiction is asserted in a forum remote from the defendant's residence
or the place or wrongdoing,' 0 is there a unified test that should be applied in all
jurisdictional arenas? In particular, has the Supreme Court appropriately articulated
separate tests for personal jurisdiction in the context of interstate business activities
having effects within the forum, on the one hand, and in the context of intentional torts
committed in one state but having effects in another? Beyond this, what is the meaning
and relationship of the different tests? Does the BurgerKing" purposeful availment
test developed in the context of interstate business activities contemplate a subjective
or an objective inquiry? What is the meaning of the express aiming or targeting
concept adopted by the Supreme Court in the intentional tort context in Calder v.
Jones?12 Is that test subjective or objective? Is it distinct from the purposeful availment
test? And if the tests are related, what is the nature of that relationship? And finally,
what is the relationship of either or both of these tests to the Zippo sliding scale test
adopted in whole or in part by many courts
to deal with cases arising from the conduct
3
of Internet activities by the defendant?1
No commentator has yet reconciled the Zippo, Calder, and Burger King tests,
adequately explained the relationship among them, or clearly described the context in
which each test should apply. After exploring the confusion created by these various
tests, we argue instead for a unified test for personal jurisdiction based on an objective
evaluation of the defendant's activities with regard to the forum state. Our central
conclusions are: (1) A unified approach to questions ofpersonal jurisdiction should be
applied to all cases in which jurisdiction is asserted in a forum remote from the
defendant's residence or the place of wrongdoing, regardless of the particular subject
should be limited to cases in which the forum had a valid ex ante regulatory interest in the
defendant's behavior); Leif Swedlow, Three Paradigmsof Presence:A Solutionfor Personal
Jurisdiction on the Internet, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 337, 370-75 (1997) (describing the
"spider web" approach to personal jurisdiction on the Internet); Ryan Yagura, Does Cyberspace
Expand the BoundariesofPersonalJurisdiction?,38 J. L. & TECH. 301 (1998); Carly Henek,
Note, Exercises ofPersonalJurisdictionBased on Internet Web Sites, 15 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 139, 163 (2000) ("examining the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of
the exchange of information that occurs through a Web site," which remains true to the "spirit of
the minimum contacts test"); Katherine Neikirk, Note, Squeezing Cyberspace into International
Shoe: When Should CourtsExercise PersonalJurisdictionover Noncommercial OnlineSpeech?
45 VILL. L. REV. 353 (2000); Note, No Bad Puns:A Different Approach to the Problem of
PersonalJurisdictionand the Internet, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2003) (arguing that
taking a'strict proximate cause approach to the "relatedness prong" in personal jurisdiction
analysis is the best way to tackle personal jurisdiction on the Internet).
10. The approach suggested in this Article establishes a sufficient but not a necessary test
for personal jurisdiction. Traditional jurisdiction would continue to be proper in the state of
defendant's domicile, state of incorporation, or principal place of business, because the
defendant is clearly on notice that it may be subject to suit there. See generally JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 3.3-4,3.6-7 (4th
ed. 2005). Similarly, the approach of the Article also suggests that jurisdiction would be proper
in a state where the defendant's wrongful acts giving rise to remote effects were committed.
11. BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 473-75.
12. Calder,465 U.S. at 789.
13. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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matter of the action, the legal theories that it raises, or the means by which the
allegedly wrongful conduct of the defendant has been committed. (2) The factors
informing such an approach must be sufficiently flexible to take account of the wide
array of differing contexts in which issues of personal jurisdiction are presented, and,
in particular, to take account of the unique characteristics of the Internet that have
increasingly troubled the courts in recent years. (3) The Supreme Court's apparent
importation of notions of a defendant's purpose or its intent to target the forum state is
flawed and has created more problems than it has resolved in the context of modem
actions involving informational torts. (4) Questions of personal jurisdiction should turn
on objective (rather than subjective) factors that have primary reference to whether the
defendant objectively should be on notice that it has caused the effects giving rise to
the action in the particular forum state. If such notice does exist, the court should
further inquire whether the intervening acts of third parties should relieve the defendant
of geographic responsibility for those effects and whether the balance of the interests of
the defendant, the plaintiff, and the forum state makes it fundamentally unfair to
subject the defendant to suit there.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DIFFERING, CONTEXT-SPECIFIC TESTS
FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The difficult jurisdictional questions posed by cases such as Pavlovich and Yahoo!
is compounded by the potential applicability of differing jurisdictional tests that might
be invoked to resolve them. Although the leading cases articulating these apparently
distinct tests are familiar, a brief review provides an essential foundation for further
analysis.
A. The PurposefulAvailment Test, Developed
in the Context of InterstateBusiness Activities
The Supreme Court's foundational decision establishing the minimum contacts test
for personal jurisdiction in the context of interstate business activities made no
reference to any question of the defendant's intent to cause injury in the forum. In
holding that the defendant shoe company was subject to personal jurisdiction in a
Washington action to collect unemployment compensation contributions, the Supreme
Court, in InternationalShoe v. Washington, rejected a test based on fictional presence
in favor of one inquiring whether the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with
[the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'"14 The Court reviewed cases in which jurisdiction
previously had been rejected and sustained, not in terms of the purpose or intent of the
defendant, but rather in terms of5the nature and quantum of the defendant's activities
with respect to the forum state.'

14. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
15. The Court noted that personal jurisdiction "has never been doubted when the activities
of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the
liabilities sued on," and that, conversely, "the causal presence of the corporate agent or even his
conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not
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The Supreme Court's focus on purposeful conduct of the defendant emerged in
Hanson v. Denckla.16 In rejecting the jurisdiction of the Florida courts over a Delaware
trust company in an action challenging a Florida decedent's appointment of property of
which the Delaware company was trustee, the Court emphasized the fact that the trust
settlor had moved from Pennsylvania to Florida after the trust was created, and that the
trust company had solicited and conducted no business in Florida other than routine
correspondence with the settlor.17 The trust company had not purposefully undertaken
to conduct business in the state of Florida, but rather was connected with the state only
by virtue of the fact that the other party to the agreement unilaterally had moved to the
state of Florida after the contractual relationship at issue had been established.
In World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,' 8 the Court addressed the scope of
personal jurisdiction in actions asserting product liability claims against business
entities. In holding that the New York wholesaler and retailer of an automobile
involved in an accident while it was being driven by the purchasers through Oklahoma
were not subject to personal jurisdiction there, the Court again emphasized that the
defendants had not undertaken to conduct any business in Oklahoma, and that their
only connection with the state arose as a result of the "unilateral activity" of the
purchasers driving the car there.19 The Court elaborated on Shoe's minimum contacts
test by stating that it performed "two related, but distinguishable, functions."20 The first
was to protect the defendant from the burden of litigating in a distant or inconvenient
forum. The second was to ensure that the states do not "reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 21 Citing
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there." Id. at 317.
The Court went on to note that in some cases of "continuous activity of some sorts within a
state," jurisdiction on "unrelated" causes of action had been rejected, but in others "the
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature
as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities." Id. at 318. Finally, although some "single or occasional acts" of a corporate agent
within a state had not been thought sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction to enforce liabilities
arising from those acts, others, "because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of
their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit." Id. The test
was said not to be "mechanical or quantitative" or whether the corporation's activities in a state
were "a little more or a little less." Id. at 319. Rather "whether due process is satisfied must
depend ... upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That
clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties or relations." Id.
16. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
17. The Court held that the "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant" could not satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts. Id. at 253.
The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's
activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the

defendant purposefully avails itselfof theprivilege ofconducting activities within
theforum State, thus invoking the benefits andprotectionsof its laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
18. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
19. Id. at 298.
20. Id. at 291-92.
21. Id. The Court described the first requirement as one of "reasonableness" or "fairness,"
and indicated that in view of modern means oftransportation and communication, it imposed a
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Hanson v. Denckla, the Court explained that the foreseeability that an automobile
might be taken to Oklahoma was not relevant. Rather, the relevant foreseeability is the
foreseeability "that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are
such that he should reasonably anticipatebeing haled into court there."22 The Court
concluded that this predictability requirement was satisfied where a corporation
"purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State," providing "clear notice that it is subject to suit there," and permitting it to
23
alleviate the risk of litigation by procuring insurance or withdrawing from the state.
But in Volkswagen, where there was no effort by defendants to serve the Oklahoma
market, permitting the assertion of personal jurisdiction based on an "isolated
occurrence" 4 arising from the "unilateral activity" of a third party went too far.25
The Court next relied on language of purpose in BurgerKing v. Rudzewicz, 2 6 which
involved an interstate contract dispute. Respondent had entered a franchise agreement
with Burger King to operate a Burger King restaurant in Michigan. Burger King was a
Florida corporation and the agreement provided that it should be governed by Florida
law. Rudzewicz applied for and signed the agreement in Michigan, but negotiated
directly with Burger King's Miami headquarters over certain provisions, and, later,
under the agreement arose. Burger King accepted the agreement in
when disputes
27
Florida.
The Supreme Court sustained personal jurisdiction in Florida over Rudzewicz in
Burger King's United States District Court action for past due rentals. The Court again
emphasized that the Due Process Clause functions to ensure predictability that allows
defendants to structure the scope of their business operations with assurance as to
where they might be subject to suit.2 8 "Where a forum seeks to assert specific
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant ... this 'fair warning' requirement is
satisfied if the defendant has 'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the
,29 The Court's focus was not on Rudzewicz's intent to cause injury in the
forum. ....
less stringent restriction on the scope of state court jurisdiction than it originally did. The
fairness issue was to be evaluated taking into account the burden on the defendant, the interest
of the plaintiff in obtaining relief, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
judicial system's interest in the efficient resolution of controversies, and the interest of the
affected states in furthering their substantive policies. In apparent reference to the second,
"sovereignty" component of minimum contacts analysis, the Court indicated that even where the
defendant "would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the
tribunals of another state," and even if the forum state has a strong interest in applying its law to
the controversy and is the most convenient location for the litigation, it may sometimes lack
jurisdiction as a result of territorial limits on the sovereignty of the states. Id. at 293-94.
22. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 295.
25. Id. at 298.
26. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
27. Id. at 464-69.
28. Id. at 471-72.
29. Id.at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
Applying these principles to the contract dispute before it, and considering the negotiations
leading to the formation of the contract, its terms, and the future consequences that were its
intended objective, the Court sustained the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Rudzewicz on
the ground that he had deliberately reached out to accept the benefits of doing business with a
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forum, but on the activities by which he voluntarily reached out to do business with a
Florida corporation. Having done so, he was properly subjected to suit in Florida for
misconduct in the course of the relationship that predictably caused injury there.
The Court's last decision invoking the concept of purposeful availment as a basis
for personal jurisdiction in the context of interstate or international business activity
was Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court.30 The defendant was a Japanese
corporation that sold valve assemblies for tire tubes manufactured by a Taiwanese
corporation and exported by it to the United States. A motorcycle tire incorporating
one of the tubes containing an Asahi valve exploded, causing an accident in
California. 31 In considering personal jurisdiction over Asahi as a third-party defendant
in the ensuing California product liability action, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
phrased the issue as whether "mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that
the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would
reach the forum State in the stream of commerce constitutes 'minimum contacts'
between the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise ofjurisdiction
'does
32
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
In an opinion joined by only three other members of the Court on this point, Justice
O'Connor concluded that Asahi had not "purposefully established minimum contacts"
with the forum as required by Burger King, and also relied on Hanson v. Denckla for
the proposition that the defendant must "purposefully avail itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws." 33 Reviewing a conflict of authority among both state and federal courts on
whether a defendant's awareness that its goods would be swept into the forum in the
stream of commerce was sufficient to satisfy these requirements, Justice O'Connor
concluded that "something more" was required. 4 The defendant
must have engaged in
35
some act "purposefully directed toward the forum state."
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent orpurpose to serve the
market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the
forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing
regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. But a
defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product
into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the3product
into the
6
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.

Florida corporation. Id. at 478-79. The contract contemplated wide ranging and continuing
contacts with Burger King in Florida. Id.
at 480. Rudzewicz's conduct had "caused foreseeable
injuries" to the corporation in Florida, making the exercise of jurisdiction presumptively
reasonable. Id.
30. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
31. Id. at 105-06.
32. Id. at 105 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
33. Id.at 108-09.
34. Id.at 111.
35. Id.at 112.
36. Id.(emphasis added).
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As this excerpt nicely illustrates, Justice O'Connor and three other justices insist on
actions that connect a defendant to a forum that go beyond merely permitting a product
to enter the stream of commerce.
Although eight Justices agreed that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Asahi
violated due process because it was unreasonable under the second prong of the
Volkswagen-Burger King test,37 a majority of the Court did not concur with Justice
O'Connor's analysis of the purposeful availment requirement.38 Justice Brennan, in an
opinion joined by three other Justices, concluded that deliberately placing a product in
the stream of commerce with the awareness that it would find its way to the forum state
was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that Asahi purposefully establish minimum
contacts with California. 39 He reasoned:
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the
regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail
sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being
marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise .... A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce
benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum State,
and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate commercial
activity. 40

In such circumstances, the defendant reasonably could anticipate litigation in the forum
state and could take steps to insure or avoid the sale of its product in the state. 41
In sum, InternationalShoe, Hanson, Volkswagen, BurgerKing, andAsahi, all were
suits arising from the conduct of interstate or international business in which the court
restricted the scope of personal jurisdiction to forums in which the defendant directly
or indirectly conducted its business, creating the harm or risk of harm in the forum that
gave rise to the plaintiff's action. In none of the cases did a majority of the Court rely
on the purpose or intent of the defendant to cause injury in the forum or to injure the

37. Id. at 114; id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
38. Id. at 115 (majority opinion); id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
39. Id. at l21.
40. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
41. Justice Stevens concurred specially without adopting the reasoning of either Justice
O'Connor or Justice Brennan on this point, finding it unnecessary to the decision in view of the
Court's broad agreement that the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in the
circumstances of Asahi would be unreasonable. However, he indicated that the proper resolution
of the "purposeful availment" requirement in this context should turn primarily on quantitative
factors, finding no "unwavering line... between 'mere awareness' that a component will find
its way into the forum State and 'purposeful availment' of the forum's market." Id. at 122
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). "Whether or not [Asahi's] conduct rises to
the level of purposeful availment requires a constitutional determination that is affected by the
volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components. In most circumstances I
would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in deliveries of over
100,000 units annually over a period of several years would constitute 'purposeful availment'
even though the item delivered to the forum State was a standard product marketed throughout
the world." Id.
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plaintiff there. Rather, the Court relied on the nature and quantum of the defendant's
business activities in the forum and the defendant's objective awareness that a decision
to conduct interstate business operations required it to accept the consequences of
those operations in other states.
B. The Calder Effects Test, Developed in the Context
of IntentionalTorts Having InterstateEffects
Where the conduct of an intentional tortfeasor in one state foreseeably has caused
injury in another, the Supreme Court has adopted an apparently distinct test for
personal jurisdiction. In contrast to the interstate business cases, however, the Court's
approach to such cases has focused centrally on the defendant's purpose or intent to
injure the plaintiff in the forum state.
Keeton v. HustlerMagazine, Inc.42 straddles the boundary between cases involving
intentional torts committed outside the forum state causing injury within and torts and
other wrongful conduct arising from the conduct of interstate business operations in the
forum. In Keeton, the Court considered whether New Hampshire had exceeded
constitutional limits by asserting jurisdiction in a defamation action by a New York
resident against an Ohio corporation that published a nationally circulated magazine in
which the allegedly defamatory article had appeared. The Court concluded that
"[riespondent's regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to
support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the
magazine.4 3 The circulation of the magazine within the state was purposefully directed
at New Hampshire, and was not "random, isolated, or fortuitous."" In sum, "[w]here,
as in this case, respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc., has continuously and deliberately
exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine." 45 Although Keeton
involved an intentional tort, the Supreme Court's analysis still fell within the main line
of its previous interstate business decisions. Keeton restricted the scope of personal
jurisdiction in suits arising from the conduct of an interstate business to forums in
which the defendant directly or indirectly conducted its business, without examining
where the defendant had targeted its activities.
The Court first directly confronted the scope of personal jurisdiction in actions
based on intentional torts not arising from the defendant's conduct of interstate
business in Calderv. Jones.46 Superficially, the case resembled Keeton. Theplaintiff, a
California resident, commenced a libel action in California state court based on an
article published by the National Enquirerand circulated in California. In addition to
the Enquirerand its local distributing company, the defendants included the author and
editor of the article, who resided and worked in Florida.47 The issue before the Court
was whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants
violated due process. The case differed from Keeton in the important respect that it

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

465 U.S. 770 (1984).
Id. at 773-74.
Id. at 774 (quoting the opinion of the District Court).
Id. at 781.
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Id. at 784-86.
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involved defendants who did not themselves seek to sell products or services in
California.48
In sustaining the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court endorsed an
"effects" test that has proved difficult to interpret in subsequent cases.
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California
resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career
was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the
brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury
to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the
focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdictionover petitioners
is thereforeproper
in Californiabasedon the "effects" of their Floridaconduct
49
in California.
Had the Court stopped there, the opinion would have provided little support for
importing some sort of desire or motivation to cause injury in the forum or to target the
plaintiff into personal jurisdiction analysis. The focus was on the harm that defendants
had caused with full awareness that the effects of their conduct would be felt in
California.
However, petitioners contended that they should not be subjected to personal
jurisdiction in California based merely on the foreseeability that their conduct would
cause harm there because they had no control over the business operations of the
Enquirer or the circulation of the paper. The Court responded with the "express
50
aiming" language that has caused so much difficulty in subsequent decisions.
[P]etitioners are not charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their
intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California.
Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would
have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the
brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and
works and in which the NationalEnquirerhas its largest circulation. Under the
circumstances, petitioners must 'reasonably anticipate being haled into court there'
to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article .... 51
The Court added that "[a]n individual injured in California need not go to Florida to
seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the

48. The author was a reporter employed by the Enquirerwho was a resident of Florida. The
record showed that he traveled to California frequently on business, relied on phone calls to
California to gather information for the article, and visited the State on at least one occasion in
connection with the article. However, the Supreme Court expressly declined to rely on the visit
and phone calls to sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 787 n.6. The editor of the
allegedly defamatory article also lived and worked in Florida and had visited California only
twice on a pleasure trip and to testify in an unconnected trial. Id. at 786.
49. Id. at 788-89 (emphasis added) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)).
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. Id. at 789-90. (emphasis added) (italics added) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 444 U.S. at 297).
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injury in California.... In this case, petitionersareprimaryparticipantsin an alleged
wrongdoingintentionally
directedat a Californiaresident,andjurisdictionover them
52
is properon that basis.
Two important questions arise from Calder'sexpress aiming and intent language.
First, how should intent and express aiming be interpreted? As the law of torts
demonstrates, intent is an elusive concept. Definitions of intent range from deliberate
indifference, to knowledge to a substantial certainty, to subjective intent or motivation
to harm the plaintiff.53 Most fairly read, the Court's opinion in Calder appears to
equate the defendant's requisite intent to cause harm or effects within the forum state
with the intent sufficient to impose liability for an intentional tort (i.e., knowledge to a
substantial certainty that harm will result).54 However, for jurisdictional purposes, that
knowledge must relate to the likelihood of harm in the forum state, rather than the
likelihood of harm to the plaintiff. Nevertheless, some courts appear to have read the
express targeting language of Calder to endorse some sort of subjective intent or
motivation to cause harm to the plaintiff in the forum.55 Post-Calder decisions applying
the effects test in cases involving intentional personal torts, business torts, and torts
committed by means of the Internet have evidenced considerable
confusion over the
56
kind of intent that is relevant in applying the Caldertest.
A second unanswered question raised by Calderis what relationship that decision's
effects test bears to the purposeful availment requirement for personal jurisdiction
adopted by the Supreme Court in interstate business cases. Although Calder itself
never relies on the purposeful availment standard, some post-Calder personal
jurisdiction cases have treated the effects test as an alternative way to establish
purposeful availment.57 Others have treated it as a separate test for personal jurisdiction
that applies in intentional tort cases. 58 These conflicting currents are addressed below.

52. Id. (emphasis added).
53.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1967); FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING

JAMES, JR., & OSCAR S. GIRAY, TIE LAW OF TORTS § 3.3 (3d ed. 1996) ("A result is intended if

the act is done for the purpose of accomplishing the result or with knowledge that to a
substantial certainty such a result will ensue."); accordDAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24
(2000).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
55. See infra note 88.

56. See infra Part II.B.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 113-19.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 121-28.
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C. The Zippo Sliding Scale Test,
Developed in the Context of Internet Activities
In Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,5 9 an early but influential case
considering personal jurisdiction in cases involving wrongs committed by means of the
Internet, the court used a sliding scale to determine whether the operation of a Web site
can support the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
The Zippo Court distinguished three levels of Internet activity to measure an Internet
site's connections to a forum state.60 At one end is a "passive" Web site, "where a
defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to
users in foreign jurisdictions." 61 Under Zippo, maintenance of such a passive site is not
sufficient alone to support the exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction in another state where a
user may access it.62 The "middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a
user can exchange information with the host computer." 63 In these cases, "the exercise
of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site." 64 At the other end

59. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (applying the sliding scale to personal

jurisdiction analysis and finding personal jurisdiction over a California corporation "doing
business" over the Internet by contracting with approximately 3000 individuals and seven
Internet access providers in Pennsylvania to permit "downloading of the electronic messages"
that formed the basis of the suit).
Six circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits have
expressed approval for or applied the Zippo test. In addition, 164 decisions of federal and state
courts involving Internet jurisdiction have cited Zippo, with forty-six of these occurring since
the start of 2001. Denis T. Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in
DeterminingPersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace,58 Bus. LAw. 601,602 (2003); see also ALS
Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714-15 (4th Cir. 2002) (adopting
and adapting the Zippo sliding scale test); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d
883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying the Zippo test and finding jurisdiction over Pennsylvania
defendant because of a Web site consisting primarily of "passively posted information," since it

also provided passwords to Michigan residents to access their blood test results on the site as
part of their service contracts, and showed results of screening 4579 infant deaths that included
a breakdown for Michigan, which suggested that defendant used data collected from Michigan

residents); GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1348 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (relying on Mink and Cybersell,progeny of Zippo, to refuse finding jurisdiction over nonresident telephone companies simply because their online Yellow Pages could be accessed from

the forum); Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297, 1299 (10th Cir.
1999) (failing to find jurisdiction over a "passive Web site"); Mink v. AAAA Dev. L.L.C., 190
F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (using the Zippo sliding scale and finding a printable mail-in
form, a toll-free call-in number, a posted e-mail address and a "passive" Web site that did not
take orders were not enough to establish jurisdiction in Texas over a Vermont Web site
operator).
60. See Zippo Mfg., 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (discussing the three levels of Internet activity).
61. Id.
62. See id. ("A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to
those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.").
63. Id.
64. Id
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65
of the scale are "situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Intemet."
If a defendant "enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve
transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal
the knowing and repeated
'66
jurisdiction is proper.
The Zippo test relies on objective factors in determining whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is proper. The greater the quantum of defendant's Web site activities, the
more likely the court is to uphold jurisdiction. The Zippo test differs from the
traditional purposeful availment test in that it does not apparently rely on the quantum
and nature of all of defendant's activities with respect to the forum, but on the level of
interactivity demonstrated by the defendant's Web site alone. Zippo's sliding scale
categories do not consider defendant's non-Interet contacts with the forum state. For
example, the Web site of a defendant which advertises but does not sell beachwear to
California residents may not be interactive enough to sustain jurisdiction under the
Zippo test, but the defendant's other contacts with California may be sufficient to
satisfy the purposeful availment test. Zippo also differs from the Caldereffects test.
For instance, the general interactivity of a Web site may be adequate to satisfy Zippo,
regardless of whether it is targeted toward a specific state.67
II. CONFUSION REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY, MEANING, AND RELATIONSHIP OF

THE VARIOUS CONTEXT-SPECIFIC TESTS FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The presence of multiple, context-specific tests for personal jurisdiction has created
undesirable uncertainty as to which of the tests should be applied to particular cases, as
well as to the meaning of and relationship among those tests.
A. Which Test Applies?
For example, Calder arose in the print defamation context, and routinely has been
applied by courts in similar cases. 68 However, where the defamatory material has been

65. Id.
66. Id.
The Zippo Court also noted that "[t]raditionally, when an entity intentionally reaches
beyond its boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific
jurisdiction is proper." Id.
67. Several commentators have criticized the Zippo framework as an inappropriate
approach to Internet jurisdiction cases. See Borchers, supra note 9, at 479, 489 (commenting
that the Zippo framework "should be ignored, at least in libel cases"); Robert M. Harkins, Jr.,
The Legal World Wide Web: Electronic PersonalJurisdictionin CommercialLitigation, or
How to Expose Yourself to LiabilityAnywhere in the World with the Press ofa Button, 25 PEPP.

L. REv. 451,475-76 (1997); Daniel Steuer, Comment, The Shoe Fitsand the Lighter is Out of
Gas: The ContinuingUtility ofInternational Shoe andthe Misuse andIneffectiveness ofZippo,
74 U. CoLO.L. REv. 319, 321 (2003).

68. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248,254,259 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Calder in a
print defamation case involving allegedly defamatory letters about a boxer sent to the forum
state where the court found that the letters were not expressly aimed at the forum state and the
forum state did not have a "unique relationship" with the boxing industry as the motion picture
industry did with California in Calder); Noonan v. Winston Comp., 135 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir.
1998) (applying Calder to print defamation case where the court noted that defendants did not
expressly aim activity at the forum state because "[t]he size of a distribution of offending
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posted on the Internet, at least one court has applied Zippo as the primary controlling
authority. 69 The court did assert that Zippo and Calderwere not "in tension" but this is
doubtful. 70 Similarly, where defamation claims have arisen in the context of the
conduct of interstate business activities, some courts have relied primarily upon the
purposeful availment test of BurgerKing while also referring to Calder.7' By contrast,
other courts have relied primarily upon the Calder test in such cases while referring
incidentally to purposeful availment.72
Many courts have applied Calder to cases alleging intentional torts other than
defamation. Claims subjected to Calder's express aiming or intentional targeting
requirements have included trademark infringement, RICO violations,
misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, trademark dilution, tortious
interference with contract, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.73 But other courts have
inconsistently applied BurgerKing to the same torts where they arose in the business

material helps determine whether a defendant acted intentionally" and that "j]ust as widespread
circulation of a publication indicates deliberate action," so "thin distribution" may indicate a
lack of purposeful contact); Chaiken v. W Publ'g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1028 (2d Cir. 1997)
(applying Calder to a print defamation case where defendant did not "expressly aim[]" its
actions at Massachusetts since he "only sent four copies" of the publication to the forum state
and "had no reason to think that the brunt of the harm would be felt there").
69. See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467,472-73 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Zippo and Calder
to an Internet defamation case, first finding that the Web site was not interactive under Zippo
and then finding that the defendant did not expressly aim allegedly defamatory statements
toward residents of the forum state).
70. Id.at 471-72 (noting that the "Zippo scale" is not in conflict with the Caldereffects test

for intentional torts).
71. See Gordy v. Daily News, 95 F.3d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the purposeful
availment factor "undergoes a certain amount of distortion" when jurisdiction is based on an
intentional act committed outside the forum that has intended effects within the forum and that it
is difficult to see how such a foreign actor "invoke[s] the benefits and protections of [the
forum's] laws").
72. See Noonan v. Winston Comp., 135 F.3d 85, 90 (1st Cir. 1998).
73. See Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.
2003) (relying on the Calder effects test in a tortious interference case); Dole Foods Co. v.
Watts, 303 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying express aiming requirement in a case involving

fraud, deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion); Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195
F.3d 208, 212 (5th Cir. 1999) (sustaining jurisdiction under Calderover German attorney for
Texas corporation in fraud, breach of contract, and breach offiduciary duty action); IMO Indus.,
Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that feeling the effects of

defendant's tortious interference in a state is insufficient to satisfy the "express aiming"
requirement of Calder); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying
Calder in trademark dilution action and finding that purposeful availment was satisfied by
"effects felt in California, the home state of Panavision" from out-of-state defendant's plan to
register domain names using the trademarks); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d
617, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying Calder in failing to find jurisdiction in a RICO case
arising from misappropriation of plaintiff's trade secrets); Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46
F.3d 1071, 1071-72 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Calder in breach of contract and intentional
interference with contractual relations case and failing to find jurisdiction); Indianapolis Colts,
Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P'ship, 34 F.3d 410,411-12 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying
Calder in a trademark infringement suit where the defendant had broadcast its games on cable
television; since the injury occurred in Indiana, defendants were amenable to suit there).
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context 7475 or Zippo where defendant's alleged misconduct was committed on the
Interet.
Rather than applying one or the other ofthe jurisdictional tests just reviewed, some
courts have amalgamated them. For example, in ALS Scan, Inc. v. DigitalService

Consultants, Inc.,7 6 the Fourth Circuit stated that it would "adopt[] and adapt[]" the
Zippo standard in resolving issues of personal jurisdiction based on Internet
activities. 7 The court concluded that
a State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person
outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State,
(2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions within

74. See, e.g., Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865,867-68
(5th Cir. 2001) (applying the Burger King purposeful availment test to a tortious interference
claim); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-64 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying the
Burger King purposeful availment requirement to an action seeking declaratory judgment
regarding trademark infringement); Far West Capital,Inc., 46 F.3d at 1077 n.5 (involving
allegations of breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relations, where
the court stated that plaintiff cited "no clear authority for establishing personal jurisdiction
based upon an intentional tort theory when the focus of the relationship is a contract not
centered in the forum state").
75. See Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding jurisdiction over Pennsylvania defendant under Zippo because the defendant's Web site
provided passwords to Michigan residents to access their blood test results on the site as part of
their service contracts, and showed results of screening 4579 infant deaths that included a
breakdown for Michigan, which suggested that defendant used data collected from Michigan
residents); GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (relying on Mink and Cybersell, progeny of Zippo, in refusing to find jurisdiction over
nonresident telephone companies simply because their online Yellow Pages could be accessed
from the forum); Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292,1297,1299 (10th
Cir. 1999) (failing to find jurisdiction over "passive Web site" under Zippo); Mink v. AAAA
Development L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333,336(5th Cir. 1999) (finding a printable mail-in form, atollfree call-in number, a posted e-mail address and a "passive" Web site that did not take orders
were not enough to establish jurisdiction in Texas over a Vermont Web site operator in a case
involving patent infringement); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 416, 418-19 (9th
Cir. 1997) (applying the traditional minimum contacts test and the Zippo test to determine that
defendant did not satisfy purposeful availment); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (finding personal jurisdiction over a California corporation
in a trademark infringement action where the corporation was "doing business" over the Internet
by contracting with approximately 3000 individuals and seven Internet access providers in
Pennsylvania to permit "downloading of the electronic messages" that formed the basis of the
suit); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714-15 (4th Cir.
2002) (adopting and adapting the Zippo sliding scale test in a copyright infringement case). But
see EDIAS Software Int'l v. Basis, 947 F. Supp. 413, 420, 422 (D. Ariz. 1996) (using the
Calder effects test rather than Zippo to exercise jurisdiction based on Intemet activity).
76. 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).
77. Id. at 714. In ALS Scan, the Maryland owner of copyrighted photographs, ALS, brought
a copyright infringement action against Digital, a Georgia Internet service provider (ISP) that
hosted a Web site posting allegedly infringing pictures. See id. at 709.
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the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential
cause of action cognizable in the State's courts. 8
Although purporting to apply Zippo, the court pointed out that the above standard is
"not dissimilar to that applied by the Supreme Court in Calderv. Jones."79 In contrast
to Zippo, which emphasizes the level of interactivity of the defendant's Web site, the
80
ALS test focuses on purposeful targeting of a particular forum by analogy to Calder.
Sometimes, the same court has applied differing tests to circumstances that seem
factually indistinguishable. This problem is illustrated by Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.
Augusta National,Inc. 8 1 and Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,82 two Ninth Circuit
trademark infringement cases with similar facts. One decision applied Calderto sustain
the exercise of jurisdiction while the other explicitly refused to apply Calder and
applied Zippo instead in rejecting jurisdiction.83 As discussed below,84 the differing

78. Id. (emphasis added). In applying this test, the court noted that personal jurisdiction
could not be exercised over Digital for its role as an ISP since Digital did not "select or
knowingly transmit infringing photographs specifically to Maryland with the intent of engaging
in business or any other transaction in Maryland." Id. at 714-15 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 714.
80. See Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594 (E.D. Va.
2003) (noting that ALS emphasizes "purposefultargeting of a particular forum, not just the level
of interactivity" to meet the purposeful availment prong of the Due Process test (emphasis in
original).
81. 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
82. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
83. In Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit applied the Zippo test and rejected personal jurisdiction
over a "passive" Web site. The court found that personal jurisdiction was lacking in Arizona
over a Florida company, Cybersell FL, that had posted an "essentially passive home page on the
[W]eb," using the name "CyberSell," which Cybersell AZ, an Arizona Company, was in the
process of registering as a federal service mark. Id. at 419. The record illustrated that "CyberSell
FL did nothing to encourage people in Arizona to access its site, and there is no evidence that
any part of its business.., was sought or achieved in Arizona." Id. When Cybersell AZ found
out about Cybersell FL infringing on its service mark, Cybersell AZ sent an e-mail to Cybersell
FL notifying it of its mark. The Court of Appeals in Cybersell rejected the use of the Calder
effects test in this setting. The court stated that there is "nothing comparable about Cybersell
FL's [W]eb page," to Calder,and that the Caldereffects test does not "apply with the same
force" to a corporation as an individual because a corporation "does not suffer harm in a
particular location in the same sense that an individual does." Id. at 420 (quoting Core-Vent
Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Despite the holding in Cybersell,the Ninth Circuit in Bancroft&Masters applied the Calder
effects test in a trademark dilution and infringement case. A California computer services
company, Bancroft &Masters, Inc. ("B &M") brought suit against a Georgia golf club, Augusta
National Inc. ("ANI") for a declaration of non-infringement of ANI's trademark. ANI, which
held several federally registered trademarks for the mark "masters" and operated a Web site at
the domain name "masters.org," sent a letter to Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), the Virginia
company that registered the domain name "masters.com" to B & M. Bancroft & Masters, 223
F.3d at 1084-85. The letter to NSI challenged B & M's use of the domain name "masters.com"
and "demand[ed] that B & M cease and desist its use of masters.com and transfer it immediately
to ANI." Id. at 1085. The court found that under Calder, ANI had "expressly aimed" its activity
at California by sending its cease-and-desist letter to NSI. See id. at 1088 ("ANI acted
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results in the two cases can be justified on other grounds, but there is no clear
distinction between them that would justify the use of separate jurisdictional tests in
reaching those results.
B. What Do the Various PersonalJurisdictionTests Mean?
Beyond confusion as to which of the various personal jurisdiction tests to apply,
uncertainty regarding their meaning also is prevalent. Particularly where the Caldertest
has been applied, courts have evidenced considerable confusion as to the meaning of
its express aiming or intentional targeting requirement.85 As the Ninth Circuit in
Bancroft & Masters recognized, the express aiming requirement "hardly defines
itself."'8 6 Obviously, the test focuses on a defendant's purpose or intent, but what kind
of purpose and what sort of intent? The Supreme Court's opinion in Caldergives very
little guidance on this question. In holding that the individual defendants in that action
"knew" that the brunt of the harm caused by their allegedly defamatory article would
be felt by the plaintiff in California,8 7 the court did not clearly indicate whether a desire
orpurposeto harm the plaintiff in California was required, or whether it was sufficient
that defendants merely were aware that such harm would occur there, or whether
jurisdiction should be sustained if defendants merely should have been awarethat the
primary impact of their conduct would occur in California. Nor did the Court indicate
whether purpose or knowledge that a particular plaintiff would suffer harm in the state
was required, or whether it was sufficient that the defendants were or should have been
aware that some industry or person might suffer predictable harm there as a result of
their conduct.
These ambiguities have led to widespread divergence among the lower courts. Some
courts have suggested that something close to a subjective purpose or desire to harm
the plaintiff in the forum state is required.88 Most courts have focused on the
intentionally when it sent its letter to NSI. The letter was expressly aimed at California .... ).
The only relevant factual differences between the two situations were that in Bancroft the
trademark holder sent a letter to a third party which sparked a declaratory judgment action by
the alleged infringer, whereas Cybersell involved a suit by the trademark owner (Cybersell AZ)
after it had given notice to the alleged infringer. This difference does not change the fact that
ANI's letter to a third-party about the acts of a California company seems less "targeted" at
California than Cybersell FL's refusal to comply with Cybersell AZ's e-mail since ANI's letter
was first sent to a third party in Virginia. Just as ANI should have known that B & M held a
Web site and that B & M, a California company, would be affected when the NSI dispute
resolution process was triggered, so Cybersell FL should have known, after receiving the e-mail
from Cybersell AZ, that by continuing to use the "CyberSell" title, it was potentially affecting
Cybersell AZ, the Arizona company that owned the service mark. Regardless of whether the
trademark owner or alleged infringer initiates suit, however, the substance of the underlying
dispute was the same, and if the Caldereffects test was relevant in one context, it was relevant
in both.
84. See infra note 308 and text accompanying notes 309-14.
85. See Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1088.
86. Id. at 1087.
87. For a discussion of Calder,see supratext accompanying notes 46-58 for discussion of
Calder.
88. See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254,263 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
knowledge alone is insufficient to satisfy the "express aiming" requirement; rather the defendant
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defendants' awareness that their conduct would cause harm in the forum state-an
interpretation that most closely corresponds with the Supreme Court's language in
Calder.8 9 However, some courts have gone further by indicating that the critical issue
is not whether the defendants were in fact aware that their tortious conduct would have
effects in the forum, but only whether they should have been aware that it would.90
And if awareness is the key, awareness of what? Is it sufficient that the defendants
are or should be aware that the primary effects of their conduct would be felt by the
plaintiff in a particular state? Many courts have stated that such awareness is not alone
sufficient to satisfy Calder's express aiming requirement, and that something more
must be required before the express aiming or targeting requirement is met. However,
these courts do not clearly define what else is required beyond a defendant's awareness
that its conduct will have a substantial or primary impact on the plaintiff in a particular
state. 91 But even on this point, a minority view holds that "there can be no serious

must manifest behavior "intentionally targeted and focused" on the forum); Bancroft& Masters,
223 F.3d at 1088 (explaining that foreseeable effects in the forum not are not enough and that
there must be express aiming which is satisfied when the defendant performs acts for the "very
purpose" of having effects in the forum, that is, individually targeting a plaintiff who the
defendant knows is a resident of the state).
89. See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 2002) (focusing on the defendant's
awareness of the forum at which its conduct was directed); Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865,869 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that knowledge was important
and that the tortious interference alleged was directed at financing agreements not to be
performed and having no relationship with Texas); Noonan v. Winston Comp., 135 F.3d 85, 91
(1st Cir. 1998) (focusing on defendant's awareness of harm reaching the forum state in
determining jurisdiction under Calder).
90. See Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting
jurisdiction where Israeli defendant had "no reason to think" that the brunt of harm would be
suffered in Massachusetts; rather, defendant had "reason to believe" that the effects would be
felt in Israel); Gordy v. Daily News, 95 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1996) (sustaining jurisdiction
because defendants knew that the plaintiff resided in California and had "reason to expect" that
the impact of their activities would be felt there).
91. See Revell, 317 F.3d at 473 (noting that the plaintiff's residence and harm taking place
in Texas were insufficient in an Internet defamation case where the article in question did not
refer to the plaintiff's Texas activities and was not directed at a Texas audience); Bancroft &
Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087 (noting that foreseeable effects in the forum are insufficient); Wien
Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1999) (commenting that foreseeable
injury in the forum alone is not enough absent the direction of specific acts to the forum, which
in this case included the transmission of letters, faxes and phone calls containing the fraudulent
representations); IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 261-62 (in an action for tortious interference
with the sale of a New Jersey Corporation's Italian subsidiary to a French competitor of the
German defendant, the court explained that jurisdiction in New Jersey was improper even
though the defendant knew that the "brunt of the harm" would be suffered by plaintiff in New
Jersey; courts applying Calderto business torts have adopted a "narrow construction" and it is
not enough that the defendant knows that the plaintiff's principal place of business is in the
forum); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (trademark
infringement case, requiring more than merely registering a trademark and placing it on a Web
site with knowledge plaintiff would suffer the brunt of the harm in forum state where plaintiff's
principal place of business was located, but sustaining jurisdiction because defendant attempted
to extort money from plaintiff in California in response to a cease-and-desist letter); ESAB
Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that it was
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doubt" after Calder that the state in which the 92
victim of a tort suffers injury can
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Additional uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the express aiming
requirement in Calder cases was created by the California Supreme Court's closely
divided opinion in Pavlovich v. Superior Court,93 described in the introduction. The
question in Pavlovichwas whether a defendant's awareness that the particular plaintiff
would suffer harm in the forum is a requirement of Calder's express aiming
requirement. In Pavlovich, the court, by a four-to-three vote, rejected jurisdiction in
California over a Texas Web site operator who had posted software designed to defeat
the plaintiff licensor's technology for encrypting copyrighted motion pictures on
DVDs.
The majority began its analysis by noting that in the area of personal jurisdiction
"few answers will be written in black and white. [Shades of] grey are dominant." 94 The
court referred in passing to Burger King's purposeful availment test, noting that it
focuses on the "defendant's intentionality." 95 But the court devoted most of its analysis
to an application of the Calder effects test on the ground that it applies to intentional
torts generally, including business torts. 96 Noting that application of Calderhad been
"less than uniform," and that courts applying Calder to nondefamation cases had
adopted "a mixture of broad and narrow interpretations,, 97 the majority concluded that
most courts agreed that the assertion, without more, that a defendant knew or should
have known that his intentional acts would cause harm in the forum state was not
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 98 Instead, plaintiff must show that the defendant
knew that the plaintiff would suffer the brunt of the harm caused by the tortious activity
in the forum and "point to specific99activity indicating that defendant expressly aimed
its tortious conduct at the forum."
Finally, the majority concluded that it was not sufficient that the defendant knew or
should have known that the information posted would harm the motion picture,
computer, and consumer electronic industries centered in Califomia.1°° The relevant
question was not whether the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct
might have an industry-wide effect in the forum state, but rather whether the defendant

insufficient that the defendant knew that its scheme, if successful, would result in lost sales by
company headquartered in South Carolina and that a contrary holding would always sustain
jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state).
92. Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1997)(sustainingjurisdiction
in Illinois under Calderover claim for interference with economic advantage where defendant
threatened the Illinois plaintiff's customer in New Jersey with infringement, leading the New
Jersey customer to cancel its contract with the plaintiff).
93. 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
94. Id. at 6 (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
95. Id.at 7 (quoting U.S. v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623 (1st Cir. 2001)).
96. See id.
("Although Calder involved a libel claim, courts have applied the effects test to
other intentional torts, including business torts.").
97. Id.
at 7-8 (quoting IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254,261 (3rd Cir. 1998)).
98. Id.at 8 ("[M]ost courts agree that merely asserting that a defendant knew or should
have known that his intentional acts would cause harm in the forum state is not enough to
establish jurisdiction under the effects test.").
99. Id.(quoting IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 266).
100. Id.at 11-12.
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had intentionally targeted the particular plaintiff in the forum.'10 That requirement was
not satisfied because the defendant did not know that the plaintiff licensing entity was
located in California, and because the unilateral acts of Web site users in downloading
10 2
the information in question could not satisfy the express aiming requirement.
Three dissenting Justices took a completely different approach. In their view, the
intended targets of the defendant's conduct "were not individual persons or businesses,
but entire industries." 10 3 The defendant knew that at least two of the industries targeted
in their effort to defeat the encryption technology, the motion picture and computer
industries, were located in California. 104 It did not matter that the defendant did not
know the precise identities or locations of each targeted individual.' 05
Even Burger King's purposeful availment test has proved less than self-defining.
The Supreme Court has offered a variety of formulations of the requirement. In Burger
King, for example, the Court variously referred to the test as requiring that the
defendant have "purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum,"' 16 that
the defendant "purposefully establish 'minimum contacts' in the forum state,"' 0 7 and
that the defendant "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 08 Each
of these formulations differs from the others, and may lead to different results in
differing cases. For example, in a case where the defendant's activities are not
commercial, the first and second formulations might sustain jurisdiction, while the last
might not. Similarly, purposefully establishing minimum contacts with the forum is a
more flexible and inclusive articulation that might reach beyond a case in which a
defendant had purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum. This is
particularly true if, as some courts have done, the latter requirement is interpreted in a
way that requires the defendant to have targeted particularforum residents. 109 Lower
courts have similarly articulated a plethora of differing formulations of the Burger
King test."10

101. Id. at 8-9.
102. Id. at 10-13. The majority noted that even if the defendant should have learned who the
licensor was, he could not have known this fact when the posting occurred because the plaintiff
was not formed until later. Id. at 11.
103. Id. at 14.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 474 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
108. Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
109. See Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 11.
110. See, e.g., Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir.
1999) (requiring defendant to purposefully direct activities at residents of the forum state); Wien
Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that defendant must
"purposefully avail himself of the privilege of causing a consequence" in the forum); ESAB
Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) (requiring defendant to engage
in some activity "purposefully directed" to the forum state); Gordy v. Daily News, 95 F.3d 829,
831-32 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction with the forum by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum; noting that the purposeful availrnent test "undergoes a certain
amount of distortion" in intentional tort cases); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,
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The Zippo formulation for Intemet cases has proven equally indeterminate. Most
apparently, this is because Zippo provides no guidance as to how cases falling into its
middle category of "interactive" Web sites should be resolved, other than the opaque
observation that in this area, whether the exercise of jurisdiction is proper is to be
determined by examining the "level of interactivity" and the "commercial nature ofthe
exchange of information" over the site.'' A number of courts applying Zippo to cases
involving Internet activities have found its formulation inadequate and have resorted to
either the Burger King purposeful availment or Caldertargeting formulation to resolve
the cases before them,
invoking all of the ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in
2
those approaches." 1
C. What is the RelationshipAmong the Various JurisdictionalTests?
Beyond uncertainty over the meaning of the various purpose, effects, and express
aiming or targeting requirements and the kinds of cases to which they should be
applied, courts have evidenced confusion over the relationship between and among the
various tests. In FarWest Capitalv. Towne,"U3 a Tenth Circuit case involving breach of
contract and tortious interference claims, the court noted that there was no clear
authority for applying Calder analysis to intentional tort cases where the focus of the
relationship of the parties was contractual." 4 However, the court then went on to
analyze and reject jurisdiction under Calder on the ground that an allegation, without
more, that an out-of-state defendant had injured a forum resident by interfering with its
contractual rights was insufficient.' 15 The court apparently viewed Calder'stargeting
test as simply one manifestation of analysis under BurgerKing's purposeful availment
test in cases involving contractual relations.
Other courts similarly have regarded Calder as synonymous with the purposeful
availment requirement of BurgerKing."6 For example, in Bancroft & Masters,Inc. v.
1263 (6th Cir. 1996) (focusing on BurgerKing's requirement that defendant must take acts that
purposefully create "a substantial connection" with the forum state); Far West Capital, Inc. v.
Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that defendant must purposefully avail
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state).
111. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
112. See, e.g., Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., 334 F.3d 390, 397-401
(4th Cir. 2003) (applying ALS, Zippo, and Calder to reject jurisdiction in Maryland in a
trademark infringement and dilution action based on defendant's operation of a semi-interactive
Web site having a "strongly local" Illinois character); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318
F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying on the "purposeful availment" test in applying Zippo to an
interactive Web site); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Calderlike analysis to personal jurisdiction issue in case involving interactive Web site); Young v. New
Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-64 (4th Cir. 2002) (adopting the ALS Scan and Calder
tests but relying primarily on Calder in neglecting to consider the interactivity of defendant's
Web site and instead focusing on whether the defendant expressly "aimed" conduct at the forum
state); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714-15 (4th Cir. 2002)
("adopting and adapting" the Zippo test by adding concepts from Calder and requiring that
defendant direct conduct into a state with manifest intent to conduct business within the state).
113. 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 1077 n.5.

115. Id.at 1079.
116. See Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1131
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Augusta NationalInc., previously discussed,' 17 the Ninth Circuit used the two concepts
interchangeably in applying the Caldereffects test. The court concluded "that B & M
demonstrated purposeful availment by ANI under the Calder effects test." ' 18 In
determining jurisdiction, the court used the terms "purposeful availment" and "express
aiming" interchangeably, and assumed that they had one meaning. Similarly in
Pavlovich,the California Supreme Court regarded the Caldereffects test as a method
of establishing purposeful availment.119
Other courts apparently have regarded Calder not as synonymous with Burger
King's purposeful availment test, but as one aspect of a broader minimum contacts
analysis. 120 Yet other courts have regarded Calderand BurgerKing as alternative tests,
invoking one or the other depending upon the type of claim that is asserted.' 21 For
(9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the purposeful availment requirement was satisfied because the
defendant had satisfied the Calder effects test); Young, 315 F.3d at 262-63 (stating that
purposeful availment is an alternate method of proving that the defendant directed his activities
at the forum); Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2002)
(using the Calder three-prong test as a way to satisfy the purposeful availment requirement);
Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000)
(concluding "that B & M has demonstrated purposeful availment by ANI under the Calder
effects test"); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the Caldertest and purposeful availment as two ways of "grounding jurisdiction");
Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595-96 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(noting that ALS emphasizes purposeful targeting, "not just the level of interactivity," to meet
the purposeful availment prong of the Due Process test and specifically stating that purposeful
availment is "an alternate method of proving that the defendant directed his activities at the
forum"); see also Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106
F.3d 284, 289 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that when the defendant willfully infringed copyrights
owned by the plaintiff, and the defendant knew the plaintiff's principal place of business was
located within in the forum, this alone was sufficient to satisfy the purposeful availment
requirement of Calder);Rodriguez Salgado v. Les Nouvelles Esthtiques, 218 F. Supp. 2d 203,
212 (D.P.R. 2002) (where, after applying the Caldereffects test, the court held that LNE did not
purposefully avail itself in Puerto Rico and lacked minimum contacts); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620-22 (C.D. Cal.1996), aft'd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding that purposeful availment was satisfied using the effects test of Calderwhen defendant
knowingly registered plaintiff's domain names as trademarks and defendant "harmed
Panavision, the brunt of which Panavision has borne in California," which defendant "knew
would likely happen," because Panavision's principal place of business was in California).
117. See supra notes 81-83.
118. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088 (emphasis added). The court stated that "[tihe letter was
expressly aimed at California because it individually targeted B & M, a California corporation
doing business almost exclusively in California," that "the effects of the letter were primarily
felt, as ANI knew that they would be, in California" and that the defendant therefore
demonstrated "purposeful availment." Id.(emphasis added).
119. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2002) (referring to the Caldereffects
test as a test for "determining purposeful availment").
120. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865,869 (5th Cir.
2001) (in rejecting personal jurisdiction in the context of tortious interference with a Texas
corporation's Maryland financing agreements, the court of appeals stated that the Calder test is
not a substitute for facts demonstrating purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum state
and that in-state effects are only one part of minimum contacts analysis).
121. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446,455 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003)
(treating Calderas an "alternative to the 'minimum contacts' analysis for specific jurisdiction").
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example, in Remick v. Manfredy,122 the court applied the Burger King test to a breach
24
of contract claim,' 23 but applied Calder to related tort claims for defamation,1
misappropriation of image and likeness,' 25 and interference with contractual
relations. 126 In Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 127 the Ninth Circuit
distinguished between "purposeful availment," applicable in contract and other cases
involving the conduct of business within a state, and "purposeful direction," applicable
in tort cases involving extraterritorial conduct, equating the purposeful direction (but
not the purposeful availment) standard with the Caldereffects test.' 28 Yet other courts
have cited and applied
both tests, without explaining the relationship, if any, that they
29
saw between them. 1

Even greater uncertainty has arisen in cases considering the relationship of Zippo,
Calder,and BurgerKing in the context of Internet activities. In Revell v. Lidov, 30 for
example, the Fifth Circuit applied both the Zippo and Calder tests in an Internet
defamation action against an online bulletin board and an alleged defamer, asserting
(dubiously) that there was no "tension" between the tests.' 31 Revell, a Texas resident,
sued Lidov, a Massachusetts resident, and Columbia University for defamation arising
out of an article posted on a Columbia University bulletin board. 32 In applying the
Zippo test, the court decided that the bulletin board was "interactive" because
individuals could "send information to be posted, and receive information that others
33
have posted," rather than simply "send information" as was the case in Zippo. 1
Once the court determined that the Columbia site was interactive, the court blurred
the Zippo and Caldertests by deciding to "evaluate the extent of this interactivity" with
respect to Calder, not Zippo. 34 However, since the level of interactivity is part of
Zippo, not Calder,the court never actually examined the interactivity of the Web site.
Rather, applying Calder, the court examined Revell's relationship with Texas and
Lidov's subjective knowledge about Revell's status as a Texas resident. The court
decided that since the article "contains no reference to Texas... or Texas activities of
Revell, and was not directed at Texas readers as distinguished from readers in other

122. 238 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001).
123. See id. at 256-57.
124. See id. at 257-58.
125. See id. at 259.
126. See id. at 260.
127. 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004).
128. Id. at 802-03.
129. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Griffis v.Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn.
2002) explained that purposeful availment is necessary to establish specific jurisdiction and then
went on to explain that in establishing jurisdiction over Griffis the district court "in particular"
relied on the Caldereffects test.
130. 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 472. The court reserved the "difficult question" of whether a .'Zippo-passive' site
could still give rise to personal jurisdiction under Calder." Id. at 473 n.30.
132. Id. at 469.
133. Id. at 472 (emphasis in original).
134. See id. The court noted that the Caldereffects test is "but one facet of the ordinary
minimum contacts analysis, to be considered as part of the full range of the defendant's contacts
with the forum." Id. at 473 (citing Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253
F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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states... Texas was not the focal point of the article or the harm suffered."' 35 The
court further noted that the "sources relied upon and activities described in the
allegedly defamatory publication should in some way connect with the forum if Calder
is to be invoked."' 136 Additionally, the court pointed out that "[k]nowledge of the
particular forum in which a potential plaintiff will bear the brunt of the harm forms an
essential part of the Caldertest."' 137 However, Lidov did not know that Revell was a
resident of Texas when he posted the article, so he lacked "knowledge of the forum at
which his conduct is directed" and therefore could not reasonably anticipate being
haled into court inthat forum. 38 The court concluded
that Texas lacked jurisdiction
39
over either defendant under Calderand Zippo.
The court did not mention why it applied both Calderand Zippo. Perhaps it was
because the case involved jurisdiction over both an online bulletin board and an
individual defendant. The court may have concluded that, with respect to Lidov, an
individual, it was most important to determine what he knew about Revell and where
he expressly aimed his allegedly defamatory statements. By contrast, since it is difficult
to determine what the online bulletin board "knew" and "aimed" to do, the court may
have found the more objective Zippo test easier to apply in that context. The court may
also have applied Calder in addition to Zippo because Revell was a defamation case
which was factually similar to Calder.4 0 However, the court did not hint that either of
the two suggested distinctions were relevant to its analysis. It simply applied the Zippo
test and then went on to apply Calderas well. In reality, the court attempted to blend
two essentially incompatible tests--one which focuses on the defendant's intent, and
the other which
relies on objective factors relating to the operation of the defendant's
41
Web site.'

135. Id. at 473 (noting that plaintiff's residence in the forum, and suffering of harm there,
will not alone support jurisdiction under Calder). The court in Panda Brandywine similarly
concluded that "[i] fwe were to accept Appellants' arguments, a nonresident defendant would be
subject to jurisdiction in Texas for an intentional tort simply because the plaintiff's complaint
alleged injury in Texas to Texas residents regardless of the defendant's contacts." 253 F.3d at
970.
136. Revell, 317 F.3d at 474 (citing Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110,
1120 (6th Cir. 1994)). But see Burt v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 757 F.2d 242, 244-45
(10th Cir. 1985) (upholding application of Calderto support personal jurisdiction in Colorado
where a Nebraska doctor had written allegedly defamatory letters about the plaintiff in response
to requests from Colorado hospitals, despite the fact that the content of the letters focused on
plaintiff's activities in Nebraska not Colorado).
137. Revell, 317 F.3d at 475.
138. Id. The court additionally noted that "[d]emanding knowledge of a particular forum to
which conduct is directed, in defamation cases, is not altogether distinct from the requirement
that the forum be the focal point of the tortious activity because satisfaction of the latter will
ofttimes provide sufficient evidence of the former." Id.
at 475-76.
139. Seeid. at476.

140. See Rice & Gladstone, supranote 59, at 629 (noting that"it is logical that defamation is
the type of cause of action where the courts can best apply the effects test").
141. Compare Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-24 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (relying solely on objective factors in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction)
with Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984) (discussing what defendants knew and if
they directedactivities at a specific forum and plaintiff).
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III. THE CASE FOR A UNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE TEST FOR
PERSONAL JURISDICTION BASED ON THE GEOGRAPHICALLY SPECIFIC SCOPE THAT
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD ASCRIBE TO THE IMPACT OF ITS ACTIVmIES

A. The Casefor a Unified Approach to Issues of PersonalJurisdiction
In summary, the Supreme Court and lower courts have tended to articulate at least
three, apparently distinct, context-specific tests for issues of personal jurisdiction
depending on whether a case involves ordinary commercial activities conducted within
the forum (BurgerKing), intentionally tortious activities committed outside the forum
having effects within the forum (Calder), or Internet sites accessible from within the
forum (Zippo). This context-specific approach has not been justified on policy grounds
with one exception. Zippo rests on the concern that maintenance of a passive Web site
should not be permitted to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in the home state of
anyone who might access it, because
the defendant might then be subjected to
142
jurisdiction anywhere in the world.
This context-specific approach should be rejected for a number of reasons. Most
apparently, the adoption of differing tests applicable to cases depending on whether
they involve interstate business activities, intentional torts, or Internet activities, creates
difficulty in selecting which test to apply in cases where more than one of the
43
categories are relevant. Business activities may be conducted over the Internet.
Intentional torts having interstate impacts may be committed over the Internet.'44 And
in some cases, in which tortious activities are committed over the Internet for
commercial purposes, all three categories potentially may apply. Courts confronting
such cases have adopted differing approaches, some adopting one test, some another,

142. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F.Supp. at 1123-24 (explaining that case law revealing that "the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised isdirectly proportionate to
the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet" is
appropriate given that the "Internet makes it possible to conduct business throughout the world
entirely from a desktop"). See generally Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward
GreaterCertaintyfor InternetJurisdiction,16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1404 (2001) (noting

that "[c]ompanies benefit from the assurance that operating an e-commerce site will not
necessarily result in jurisdictional claims from any jurisdiction worldwide").
143. E.g., Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (describing situations where the defendant
"clearly does business over the Internet"); see also Pontchartrain Mortgage Corp. v. Mortgage

Asset Research Inst., Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-2653, 2004 WL 137590, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 20,2004)
(analyzing the nature of the mortgage company's Internet business in resolving jurisdictional
issue); Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 591-92 (E.D. Va.
2003) (defendant was sued after selling graduate school test preparation materials over the
Internet); Student Advantage, Inc. v. Int'l Student Exch. Cards, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1971 (AGS),
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13138, at *12-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2000) (selling discount cards in
New York over the Internet).
144. See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467,469 (5th Cir. 2002) (Internet defamation suit based
on a Web site posted by Columbia University in New York that purportedly injured plaintiff in
Texas); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2002) (defamation
occurring over an Internet Web site, sponsored by a Connecticut newspaper allegedly impacting

plaintiff in Virginia).
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and some a combination of the various context-specific tests, without any consensus on
how the tests relate to each other or whether they serve the same or differing
145
purposes.
Of course, if the various context-specific jurisdictional tests were merely varying
articulations of the same basic approach, the matter would be irrelevant, because
outcomes would be consistent no matter which test were applied. But that is not the
case. Most obviously, Burger King's purposeful availment and Calder's express
aiming or targeting approach appear to focus predominantly on the defendant's
purpose or intent.146 By contrast, the Zippo test focuses on whether business activities
are being conducted over the Internet at one end of the jurisdictional spectrum, on
whether the Web site in question is passive at the other, and, in intermediate cases, on
an apparently objective examination of "the level of interactivity and the commercial
nature of the exchange of information."' 147 Moreover, Zippo appears to focus solely on
the defendant's Internet activities, whereas the other approaches take the totality of the
defendant's contacts with the forum into account. Clearly these different approaches
could affect the result in particular cases. For example, if a Web site was purely
passive, Zippo would foreclose any possibility ofjurisdiction. The other tests, however,
to the extent they permit jurisdiction to be based on all of the defendant's activities,
might sustain jurisdiction in cases involving a passive Web site where the defendant
clearly intended to target a particular victim that he knew was located in the forum
state.
Additionally, despite the fact that BurgerKingand Calder appear to focus on some
version of the defendant's purpose and intent, their articulations of the required
purpose vary. Burger King is commonly said to require purposeful availment of the
benefits and protections of the forum's laws, in contrast with Calder,which requires
only that the defendant expressly aim his tortious conduct at the forum state, regardless
of any benefits or protections that he might receive. Courts have not interpreted Burger
King's purposeful availment requirement to mean more than that the defendant's
business activities must have a predictable, geographically specific focus. 148 They have
not required that the defendant know or have reason to know that his activities will
cause harm in the forum, or to know of the specific plaintiff's presence in the forum
state. 149 By contrast, no doubt because the targeting language of Calder lends itself
easily to that interpretation, some courts applying Calder, such as the California
Supreme Court majority in Pavlovich, have suggested that the defendant must have
knowledge that the specific plaintiff is located in the forum state, and will bear the

145. See supra Part II.
146. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 770
(1984).
147. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Con, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
148. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1987).
149. Asahi MetalIndustryCo., 480 U.S. 102, 117-18, n. 1 (1987) (citing several lower court
cases not requiring more activity than placing a product into the stream of commerce); BP
Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254,259-62 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying
BurgerKing without considering knowledge of plaintiff's presence in United States relevant);
Marriott PLP Corp. v. Tuschman, 904 F. Supp. 461,465 (D. Md. 1995) (applyingBurgerKing
in a fraud and breach of contract case without requiring knowledge of plaintiff's presence in
state).
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brunt of the harm there, in order to satisfy that decision's express aiming
requirement. 150
The Supreme Court's purposeful availment decisions have explained that the Due
Process Clause serves the dual purpose of protecting the defendant from inconvenient
litigation, and of ensuring that the sovereign authority of the states in relation to each
other is appropriately confined. 15 1 They have adopted a two-part approach under
which, at a minimum, the defendant is required to have purposefully established
sufficient minimum contacts with the state to warrant the exercise of its sovereign
authority. Provided that threshold requirement has been met, courts have required the
exercise of jurisdiction to be "reasonable," taking into account the interests of the
parties, the forum state, and the interstate judicial system. 152 This is a balancing test
under which the interests of the forum and the plaintiff are balanced against those of
the defendant, provided that the defendant has undertaken some deliberate activity
establishing a geographically specific connection with the forum. The Court has
explained that this requirement for deliberate or purposeful activity exists to place the
defendant on notice of the fora in which his activities might subject him to suit,
permitting him to take steps 1to
avoid or insure against the risk of harm that his
53
wrongful conduct has created.
There is no apparent reason to distinguish interstate commercial activities, interstate
tortious activities, and Internet activities in these respects. The need for deliberate
action and sufficient, geographically specific notice to permit the defendant to
anticipate the risk of suit in the forum state is relevant to all of them. Equally relevant
to all is the inevitable balancing of the interests of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the
forum state in determining the reasonableness of the forum's exercise ofjurisdiction
over disputes arising from harms caused by the defendant's activities. The Internet is
simply one means of communication, albeit one which casts a wider, more anonymous,
and less geographically predictable sweep than more traditional means.' 54 These
differences do not suggest a fundamentally different approach to the propriety of

150. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 7-8 (Cal. 2002).
151. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (noting that "[t]he Due
Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding
judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations'
and also "operates to restrict state power"); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980) (explaining that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a
nonresident defendant" and "protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant
or inconvenient forum").
152. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292 (requiring courts to consider "the
burden on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," "the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," "the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies" in determining whether
it is reasonable for a state to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant).
153. Id.
at 291 (noting before establishing the five reasonableness factors that "[d]ue process
requires that the defendant be given adequate notice of the suit").
154. See Edward A. Morse, State Taxation ofinternetCommerce: Something New Underthe
Sun?, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1113, 1114 (1997) (describing the Internet as a channel of
communication providing a "step" in a "trend away from geographical boundaries").
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exercising personal jurisdiction where Internet activities provide the vehicle for the
defendant's wrongful conduct, as opposed to more traditional means of information
transmission and exchange. They do, however, suggest a need to articulate a general
test for jurisdiction that will take appropriate account of these differences as they bear
on the assertion of personal jurisdiction where Internet activities are involved.15
B. The Casefor Rejecting Subjective Purposeor Intent to Cause Harm
in the Forum as a Determinantof PersonalJurisdiction
If an overarching, unified approach to issues of personal jurisdiction is to be
adopted, what should that test be? The most obvious question in view of the Supreme
Court's articulation of the purposeful availment and express aiming or targeting tests in
Burger King and Calderis what role the defendant's purpose should play in personal
jurisdiction analysis. Although the meaning of "purpose" in the purposeful availment
test has proved elusive, the very phrasing of the Calder test suggests that the

155. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978), might be read to support a context-specific approach to issues of personal jurisdictionand in the process, it may have articulated yet another "test" for personal jurisdiction issues
applicable in "domestic relations" cases. In Kulko, the Court considered the application of the
minimum contacts standard in a domestic relations context. After maintaining a marital domicile
in New York for over twenty years during which their two children were born, the parties
entered a separation agreement in New York and Mrs. Kulko obtained a Haitian divorce which
incorporated the terms of the agreement. Id. at 87. The agreement awarded custody of the
children to the father, who continued to reside in New York, during the school year except for
certain holidays, provided that they would reside with their mother, who had moved to
California, during summer vacations, and provided support payments for the time that they
resided with their mother. Id. Later the daughter, and then the son, moved to California to reside
with their mother during the school year, and the mother filed an action in California seeking to
obtain a California divorce decree and to modify the agreement's custody and support
provisions. Id.
at 88. Mr. Kulko contested personal jurisdiction to affect his support obligations
in California. Id.
The Supreme Court held that Mr. Kulko had undertaken no "purposeful act" that would
permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him in California. Ofparticular pertinence here,
the Court rejected the applicability of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws "effects"
test for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 96. Section 37 of the Restatement (Second) provides that a
state has judicial jurisdiction "over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done
elsewhere" with respect to causes of action arising from those effects unless the exercise of
jurisdiction is unreasonable. Id. (quoting RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 37

(1971). In doing so, the Court was significantly influenced by the nature of the controversy as
one involving "personal domestic relations," rather than the conduct of interstate business
affecting in-state residents, or tortious conduct undertaken in one state having predictable effects
in another. Id. at 97. However, Kulko more properly is viewed, not as endorsing a variety of
context-specific approaches to personal jurisdiction issues, but rather as consistent with a more
general test for personal jurisdiction that applies to all kinds of cases, including domestic
relations cases. That unified approach focuses on the scope of the defendant's deliberately
undertaken activities, be they commercial, tortious, Internet, or domestic. It asks whether
engaging in such activities should, as a normative matter, place the defendant on notice of the
harm or risk of harm giving rise to the action that he has caused in the particular forum state and
therefore anticipate being subjected to suit there.
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defendant's desire to injure the plaintiff in the forum should play a significant role, and
some courts apparently have concluded that it does.15 6 That conclusion should be
rejected as supported neither by the Supreme Court's decisions nor the relevant
considerations of policy.
From a policy standpoint, one initially confronts the difficulty, uncertainty, and cost
of appraising the defendant's subjective purpose with reference to the issues of causing
harm in the forum state, enjoying the benefits of the laws of that state, or being haled
into court there by a particular plaintiff. This is particularly true in the corporate
context, where the actions of an incorporeal entity are at issue, and any corporate
"purpose" would have to be determined by examining the actions and motivations of a
variety of agents acting on the entity's behalf.
The argument against a subjective, purpose-driven test draws support from the law
of torts. Under the prevailing view, responsibility for intentional misconduct does not
turn on the actor's subjective desires, but rather on whether the actor knows that
consequences are certain or substantially certain to result from her actions.' Although
the issue of liability for the consequences of one's intentional conduct differs from that
of a defendant's geographic amenability to suit, there is no apparent reason for taking a
markedly different approach to the kind of intent that makes it fair to subject a
defendant to suit in a particular geographic forum.
Under the Supreme Court's current balancing approach to issues of personal
jurisdiction, 58 it is difficult to see why subjective intent or purpose, as opposed to a
defendant's awareness to a substantial degree of certainty, should play a determinative
role. Convenience of suit is not related to purpose of wrongdoing. A defendant's
anticipation of suit and planning to avoid it should be expected and required where
significant consequences are substantially certain to result in a particular state. And the
interests of the forum and the plaintiff are the same in either event.
Consider, for example, the defendant who ships a bomb by ground carrier through
New Jersey for the purpose of injuring an intended victim in New York. If the bomb
accidentally explodes in New Jersey and injures the plaintiff there, it seems clear that
under any test of personal jurisdiction, the defendant should be subject to suit in New
Jersey for the consequences of its acts. The Supreme Court's decisions do not support

156. See supranote 88; supratext accompanying notes 93-102 (citing cases).
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (1977) (stating that "[i]ntent... has
reference to the consequences of an act rather than the act itself'); id. § 8A (defining intent as an
actor's desire "to cause [certain] consequences ... or... belie[f] that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from [his act]"); see also HARPER ET AL., supra note 53, § 3.3 ("A
result is intended if the act is done for the purpose of accomplishing the result or with
knowledge that to a substantialcertainty such a result will ensue.") (emphasis added); DAN B.
DOBBS, supra note 53, at § 24; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825 (1977) (describing an
invasion as "intentional if the actor (a) acts for the purpose of causing it, or (b) knows that it is
resulting or is substantially certain to result from his conduct"); Id. § 825 cmt. c (emphasizing
that for an invasion to be intentional it "need not be inspired by malice or ill will on the actor's
part toward the other... [but only requires] that the actor knowingly causes [an invasion]...
without any desire to cause harm"); HARPER ET AL., supra note 53, § 2.5 (describing a
requirement for trespass as acting "for the purpose of interfering with the chattel or with the
knowledge that such interference would result") (emphasis added).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
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a stringent test that would focus on the subjective desire or purpose of the defendant to
cause harm in a particular state. Moreover, the decisions are not properly interpreted to
require that the defendant be substantially certain that harm will result there, provided
that the defendant knows that his actions are substantially certain to create a significant
risk of harm in the forum. International Shoe itself made no reference to the
defendant's intent in its initial articulation of the minimum contacts test. Rather its
focus was objective, referring to the nature and quantum of the defendant's activities
with respect to the forum and the relationship of the cause of action to those
activities.15 9 Hanson and Volkswagen, in which the purposeful availment test was first
articulated, were concerned primarily with whether the unilateral act of a third party
establishing a contact with the forum could be ascribed to the defendant, and did not
suggest that any sort of subjective purpose or desire to cause harm in the forum was
required.160 Their point, rather, was that the defendant in each of those cases had not
itself deliberately engaged in activities that established a connection between the
defendant and the forum. In Burger King, the Court sustained jurisdiction on the
ground that the defendants deliberately had reached out to establish a business
connection in Florida with their franchisor. 161 The subjective intent or purpose of the
defendants to cause injury to their franchisor in Florida was not discussed. The Court
stated that the pivotal question was whether the defendant had "purposefully
established minimum contacts" with the forum.' 62 Although the Court stated that the
"foreseeability of causing injury" in another state was insufficient, it placed the
ultimate jurisdictional inquiry in normative and objective terms-whether
the
63
defendant should "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" there.
The closest the Court has come in the BurgerKing line of cases to suggesting that
some sort of subjective purpose or intent is required is in Asahi, where Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion for four Justices would have held that the Japanese
defendant that sold component valves to a Taiwanese tire tube manufacturer, whose
tube was involved in an accident in California, failed to satisfy the purposeful
availment requirement because the defendant had not engaged in any act "purposefully
directed toward the forum state."' 4 The plurality would have required additional
conduct indicating an "intent or purpose to serve the market" such as designing the
product for the forum, advertising in the forum, establishing channels for customer
service in the state, or marketing the product through a distributor serving as a sales
agent for that state.1 65 None of these objective factors suggest that some kind of
subjective desire or purpose to cause harm in the forum or to injure the plaintiffthere is
required. Moreover, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion for four Justices clearly
would not have required such intent. For them, it was sufficient that the defendant had
placed its product in the "stream of commerce" with awareness that the product would

159. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17 for discussion of Hanson and text
accompanying notes 18-25 for discussion of Volkswagen.
161. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewitz, 471 U.S. 462,487 (1985).
162. Id.
at 474 (quoting Intl Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316).
163. Id. at 474 (quoting World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
164. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
165. Id.
at 112; see also supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
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be swept into the state of California.166 So long as a participant in this process "is
aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum state, the possibility of a
lawsuit there could not come as a surprise. ' 1 67 And, in his lone concurrence in the
majority's conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction in Asahi would be
"unreasonable" whether or not minimum contacts were established, Justice Stevens
indicated (although he saw no need to reach the question) that whether purposeful
availment is found should turn on the objective question of whether the defendant had
engaged in a regular course of dealing involving substantial deliveries in California
over a period of years. 168 He said nothing about an intent or purpose to cause injury in
the forum or to injure the plaintiff there.
The Court's initial foray into the field of jurisdiction in intentional tort cases
causing effects in the forum state was consistent with this approach. In Keeton v.
HustlerMagazine, Inc., the Court focused on whether the defendant had intentionally
conducted business in the forum state, not on whether it had a purpose to harm the
plaintiff there or even to cause injury there.169 The Court noted that "[r]espondent's
regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support an assertion
ofjurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine."' 170 Further, the
Court emphasized that "[w]here, as in this case, respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc., has
continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its
magazine."'' T Keeton thus fell within the main line of the Supreme Court's previous
decisions restricting the exercise of personal jurisdiction in suits arising from the
conduct of an interstate business to forums in which the defendant had conducted its
business giving
rise to the claim. Despite the Court's reference to the defendant's
"purpose,"1 72 there is no indication that any question of subjective motivation or intent
to cause harm in the forum was at issue. The relevant intent was simply the defendant's
intent to conduct business within the state.
This brings us to Calder, where the Court, in sustaining jurisdiction over the
individual Florida defendants in California for their allegedly defamatory article about
a California resident, focused explicitly and repeatedly on the defendants' awareness
that their article would cause harm to the plaintiff in California. 173 At first blush, this
language is difficult to reconcile with the Court's other personal jurisdiction decisions
just reviewed. A purpose to cause harm to a particular plaintiff in the forum seems
pivotal to Calder'sreasoning and result. It is just this disparity that has led some courts
to the apparent conclusion that the Burger King line of cases and Calderestablish
different, context-specific tests for personal jurisdiction in interstate business cases and
intentional tort cases. As discussed in the next Part, however, the cases are reconcilable
under a more general test for personal jurisdiction that does not turn on any question of

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
46-52.

Id. at 117; see also supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
Id.
Id.
at 122; see also supra note 41.
465 U.S. 770, 781 (1983); see also supratext accompanying notes 42-45.
Id. at 773-74.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 774.
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984); see also supratext accompanying notes
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subjective purpose or intent to cause harm in the forum. 174 Rather, the cases' holdings
are consistent with a general approach to personal jurisdiction that would simply
require the defendant to have engaged in conduct that the defendant knows is
substantially certain to result in the harm or risk of harm in the forum that gives rise to
the plaintiffs claim.
C. The Case for Basing Personal Jurisdictionon Defendant's Activity
Giving Rise to the Action Which the Defendant Knows or Should Know Is
Substantially Certain to Have Its Wrongful Impact in the Forum State
The Supreme Court's treatment of personal jurisdiction issues has been
unsatisfactory in at least three important respects. First, the Court, without explanation,
has adopted two apparently differing tests for personal jurisdiction without explaining
why it has done so or the relationship between the two. Second, the Court has left the
lower courts to struggle with the application of one or the other or both of these tests in
the increasingly important areas of informational wrongs and Internet activities, even
though the tests themselves, which were designed to deal specifically with contractual
disputes, product liability claims, and intentional torts having a clear geographic focus,
seem ill adapted to this new environment. Third, even though the Court seemingly has
made both tests for personal jurisdiction turn on an appraisal of the defendant's
purpose or intent, it has failed to explore the many gradations of intent and fault that
might be relevant to jurisdictional analysis with the same sort of precision that is
customary in other areas of the law. This failure lies at the bottom of the difficulty that
the lower courts have experienced in applying traditional jurisdictional analysis to
contexts involving consequences not readily connected to a particular geographic
location. A refined analysis of the kind of intent that should be relevant to issues of
personal jurisdiction involves the consideration of a number of interrelated issues.
1. Determinative Objects of Awareness
Putting to one side the degree or level of intent or awareness that should be
determinative in the analysis of personal jurisdiction issues, the possibly relevant
objects of that awareness include (1) the defendant's awareness of the geographic
areasthat its conduct might affect, (2) his awareness of the types of claims to which he
might be subject to jurisdiction in those fora, and (3) his awareness of the particular
plaintifforplaintiffs who might assert those claims.
The Supreme Court's decisions both in the BurgerKing line and in Calder quite
clearly contemplate that the defendant must have some kind of awareness that his
conduct will establish a connection with the geographic area of the forum state. Under
Burger King the defendant is required to purposefully direct his activities toward the
forum, or to purposefully establish minimum contacts with the forum, or to have

174. Moreover, even accepted at face value, Calderdoes not require a subjective desire or
purpose to harm the plaintiff in the forum state. Instead, the Court focused on the defendants'
awarenessthat their article would harm the plaintiff in California-an approach that would be
consistent with basing jurisdictional analysis on the defendant's knowledge to a substantial
certainty that its conduct will impact the plaintiff in the forum, regardless of subjective purpose
or intent.
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"purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state."' 75 In Calder,the individual defendants were held to be subject to jurisdiction in
California because their "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly
aimed at California" and because they "knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt
by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National
Enquirer has its largest circulation."' 176 Lower courts consistently interpret this
language as requiring that the defendant act with awareness that its conduct will
establish a connection or have a wrongful impact in a particular forum state. A
defendant's knowledge that its conduct might have consequences anywhere, without
of the particular state in which those consequences will occur, is
any awareness
77
insufficient. 1
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has suggested only one substantial
reason for this particularized geographic awareness requirement, that is, to place the
defendant on notice that he might be subject to suit in a particular state and have the
opportunity to take steps to avoid or ameliorate that risk by procuring insurance or
withdrawing from the state.178 The other principal interests relevant to the personal
jurisdiction analysis-that of the defendant in avoiding inconvenient litigation, and
those of the forum state and the plaintiff in affording and obtaining convenient
redress-are at best only weakly related to the geographic particularity of the
defendant's awareness, provided that his conduct has in fact caused harm to the
plaintiff within the forum state.
A second type of awareness relates to the type of claim that might be asserted by a
plaintiff within the forum state. Putting aside the unusual case of general jurisdiction in
which a defendant's activities within the forum are so systematic and continuous that it
should anticipate suit there on any cause of action no matter whether it is related or
unrelated to those contacts,' 79 specific jurisdiction decisions of the Supreme Court and
lower courts have required that the claim asserted by the plaintiff in the forum be

175. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewitz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-75 (1985) (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
176. Calder,465 U.S. at 789-90.
177. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707,712 (4th Cir.
2002) (posting information on the Internet cannot subject the defendant tojurisdiction wherever
it can be accessed, because such information can be accessed in every state); GTE New Media
Serv., Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (jurisdiction cannot be
based on ability to access a passive Web site in the forum state because this would subject the
defendant in Internet cases to jurisdiction anywhere in the country); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell,
Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417-18, 420 (9th Cir. 1997) (following cases rejectingjurisdiction based on
ability to access a "passive" Web site worldwide).
178. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
179. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,415-16 (1984) (explaining
that even though the "respondents' claims against Helicol did not 'arise out of,' and are not
related to, Helicol's activities within Texas," the Court must still "explore the nature of
Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas to determine whether they constitute the kind of
continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins");
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (sustaining the exercise of
general jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation by an Ohio court because the corporation
carried on continuous and systematic business in Ohio).
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related to the defendant's activities there.' 80 There is more to this requirement than
some elemental notion of fairness. Rather, the relationship requirement once again is
calculated to place the defendant on notice of the scope of the risk that its conduct has
created with respect to a particular jurisdiction. To permit the defendant to be sued by
a plaintiff on a claim that has nothing to do with the defendant's activities in or with
respect to the forum would make the bedrock notice element meaningless. All that the
defendant would know or anticipate is that any deliberate activity of any kind
establishing some connection with the forum would potentially expose him to suit there
by any plaintiff on any claim that might arise from his activities anywhere. The risk
would be unknown and unquantifiable. A requirement that the defendant insure against
such a risk or cease his activities with respect to the forum to avoid harms that have
nothing to do with his conduct there would expand the authority of a state beyond the
scope of any legitimate sovereign interest.
Finally, the personal jurisdiction issue might be thought to turn on the defendant's
required degree of awareness of the identity of the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who
might assert claims related to his activities with respect to the forum state. That degree
of awareness, however, clearly is not required by the "transaction of business" cases
falling in the Volkswagen-Burger King line. In product liability suits such as those
involved in Volkswagen andAsahi, for example, the identity of the particular person or
persons who may be injured by the defendant's product is unknown, making it
impossible for the defendant to be aware of the identity of a potential plaintiff.
In this respect, cases following BurgerKing superficially appear to be inconsistent
with Calderand its progeny. Calderplaced heavy focus on the fact that the individual
defendants knew that the brunt of the harm caused by their article would be felt by the
plaintiff in California where she lived and worked and emphasized that they were
"primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California
resident."'' Subsequent cases in the Calderline frequently have relied on defendant's
knowledge or lack of knowledge of the plaintiff's residence in a particular jurisdiction
in upholding' 82 or denying' 83 jurisdiction. The most extreme example of this was in

180. HelicopterosNacionalesde Colombia,466 U.S. at 414 n.8; Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc.
v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415,418-19 (5th Cir. 1993) ("A state exercises 'specific jurisdiction'
over a non-resident defendant when the lawsuit arises from or relates to the defendant's contact
with the forum state.").

181. Calder,465 U.S. at 790.
182. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087-88 (9th Cir.
2000) (upholding jurisdiction because defendant individually targeted a plaintiff whom the
defendant knew was a resident of the forum state); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that jurisdiction was proper where defendant knew that
plaintiff would suffer harm in California where its principal place of business was located);
Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding jurisdiction where
despite small distribution of newspapers, defendant intentionally wrote and directed an article at
a resident of the forum state).
183. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 2002) (failing to find jurisdiction over
defendant under Calder or Zippo because Texas was not the focal point of the article and
defendant did not know that the plaintiff resided in Texas); Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp., 119
F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts under Calder
in a defamation case since the publisher had no reason to believe that the plaintiffs continued to
reside in Massachusetts); Pavlovich v. Superior Ct., 58 P.3d 2, 10-12 (Cal. 2002) (failing to
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Pavlovichwhere a closely divided California Supreme Court rejected jurisdiction over
a suit by the licensor of DVD encryption technology that the Texas defendant was
alleged to have misappropriated by posting a program to enable the copying of DVDs
on his Web site.18 4 Despite arguments that the defendant was aware that his conduct
would have a significant impact on the motion picture and computer industries
centered in California, the majority rejected jurisdiction, relying heavily on the fact that
the defendant did not know that the plaintiff
licensing entity was headquartered in
1 85
California until after the lawsuit was filed.
What explains this divergence between the interstate business cases following
BurgerKing and the intentional tort cases following Calder?Why is knowledge of the
plaintiff's identity and location deemed important by some courts in the latter context
but not the former? Identifying the source of this apparent inconsistency may cast light
on the reason why differing tests for personal jurisdiction have emerged in business
activity and intentional tort cases. It may also help to identify an underlying, unifying
theme.
We suggest that in both kinds of cases, the Supreme Court's underlying concern has
been whether the defendant reasonably should anticipate the impact of his activities
(and the consequent risk of suit) in a particular geographic jurisdiction.!8 6 In business
activity cases, the Court has said that a defendant who purposefully avails himself of
the privilege of conducting business activities in or directed to obtaining sales in a
particular state reasonably should anticipate that tortious or contractual injuries arising
from those activities will subject him to suit there.'8 7 No finely tuned calculus of the
precise magnitude of the risk turning on the identity of the particular plaintiff or
plaintiffs who might be injured in the state is required.

exercise jurisdiction because defendant did not know that the plaintiff's principal place of
business was in California and defendant's general knowledge that his actions "may harm
certain industries centered in California-i.e., the motion picture, computer, and consumer
electronics industries" could not alone satisfy the effects test).
184. Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 10-12.
185. Id. at 11-12. The court noted that "[b]ecause Pavlovich could not have known that his
tortious conduct would harm DVD CCA in California when the misappropriated code was first
posted, his knowledge of the existence of a licensing entity cannot establish express aiming at
California." Id.at 11. The court rejected the argument that the location of licensees in the
consumer electronics and computer industries centered in California was sufficient to show that

Pavlovich knew that his posting would cause harm to them there on the ground that "[t]he
record... indicate[d] that Pavlovich did not know that any of DVD CCA's licensees resided in
California. At most, the record establishe[d] that Pavlovich should have guessed that these
licensees resided in California." Id.at 12. By contrast, the lack of knowledge that the plaintiff
licensing entity was located there was irrelevant in the dissent's view. "When a foreign
defendant, by intentional conduct directed toward the forum, establishes the necessary minimum
contacts with that jurisdiction, he or she may be exposed to litigation there for any 'controversy
[that] is related to or "arises out of" [those] contacts ....' The plaintiffneed not be the exact
person or entity toward whom the defendant's conduct was directed." Id.at 22 (Baxter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085 (Cal. 1996)) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
186. See Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546,551 (7th Cir. 2004) (interpreting the
Supreme Court's decisions as requiring the defendant to establish minimum contacts with "the
particular state in which the court sits").
187. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewitz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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Many tort cases not arising from the conduct of interstate business may be treated
similarly. Because the defendant has engaged in wrongful conduct that he knows to a
substantial certainty will cause injury or create an actionable risk of harm in the forum
state, he should be required to anticipate the geographic sweep of the impact of his
conduct and take action to avoid the risk that his actions create. For example, where a
defendant deliberately sends a bomb from one state into another knowing that it may
explode and cause serious injury there, the geographic scope of his tortious activities is
clear. There is and should be no requirement that the defendant know the identity of the
particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who actually suffer the injury there. The defendant's
deliberate conduct with respect to the forum that a reasonable person would know is
substantially certain to cause injury there or to create a risk of harm there should be
sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction for the ensuing injuries when they occur. Such
jurisdiction should not be limited to intentional torts, such as assault, but should extend
to reckless or negligent injuries as well. The key factor is not whether the defendant's
conduct should be treated as intentional for the purpose of determining his substantive
liability in tort, but whether his conduct with respect to the particular jurisdiction is
such that he should be required to anticipate suit there for the consequences of those
actions.
In some tort cases, however, the particular geographic scope of the defendant's
tortious activity and its impact may not be apparent. Where a defendant publishes a
defamatory article, the tortious impact of that activity occurs where the plaintiff's
reputation has been injured, which turns on where his reputation is established and
known, which most often will turn on where the plaintiff lives and works, or where his
reputation has otherwise been established.' 88 In such cases, unlike those involving
sending a bomb or other dangerous instrumentality into a particular state, the fact that
the defendant has engaged in tortious activity does not automatically place him on
notice of the geographic scope of the wrongful impact ofthat activity. It is precisely in
such cases-those following the Calder line-that courts have emphasized the
defendant's awareness that the plaintiff's residence or business activities are located in
the forum state. Without such awareness, the defendant is not properly charged with
notice that his activities will have their impact there, exposing him to a risk of suit.
Thus, despite the apparently differing articulations of the jurisdictional standard in
interstate business cases illustrated by BurgerKing and Volkswagen, on the one hand,
and the extraterritorial tort cases illustrated by Calder,on the other, those decisions are
united by an underlying premise: a basic precondition for the exercise ofjurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant is the requirement that the defendant be on notice that the
harm or risk of harm created by his activities that gives rise to the plaintiff's action is
substantially certain to occur in the forum state.

188. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984) ("The allegedly libelous story
concerned the California activities of a California resident ....The article was drawn from
California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress
and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California."); Faulkner v. Ark.
Children's Hosp., 69 S.W.3d 393, 402 (Ark. 2002) (explaining that under Arkansas law a
plaintiff must demonstrate that she was defamed by a false statement of fact which damaged her
and harmed her reputation); Ellis v. Price, 990 S.W.2d 543,547 (Ark. 1999) (same); Gobin v.
Globe Publ'g Co., 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Kan. 1982) (noting that "[d]efamation actions in
Kansas" require evidence of "injury to reputation" in the community).
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2. Degrees of Awareness
If, as we suggest, the defendant's awareness of the geographic scope of the
allegedly wrongful impact of his activities should provide the touchstone for personal
jurisdiction analysis, the question remains what degree of awareness should be
required. One of the peculiarities of the Supreme Court's treatment of personal
jurisdiction issues in both the Burger King line and Calderhas been that the relevant
jurisdictional test has been phrased in terms of the defendant's purpose or intent,
without any clear analysis of precisely what kind of intent is required. This failure
should be contrasted with the careful analysis of intent typical in tort law, with fine
distinctions drawn between degrees of intent, 89 ranging from purpose, to knowledge to
a substantial certainty, 19 to recklessness (itself of two types), 191 to negligence, 192 and
with equally careful attention to the objects of that intent.

189. In tort law,
[i]f the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantiallycertain, to

result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact
desired to produce the result. As the probability that the consequences will follow
decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor's conduct loses
the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1977) (emphasis added).
190. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "intent" in relation to a battery as an act
"done for the purpose of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact.., or with knowledge
that such a result will, to a substantial certainty, be produced by his act." Id. § 18 cmt. e
(emphasis added).
191. Recklessness is also "distinguishable both from intent and from negligence" in that it
requires conduct undertaken by an actor conscious of"a high degree of risk or a risk of very
serious harm." DOBBS, supra note 53, at § 27; see also Kenneth W. Simmons, Rethinking
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 463, 475 n.50 (1992) ("The Second Restatement seems to
distinguish between recklessness as a ground for tort liability ('reckless disregard of the safety

of another,' which can be shown by an objective test, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500), and
as a ground for punitive damages ('outrageous' conduct that shows 'reckless indifference to the
rights of others,' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908).").
Illustrations 1 and 2 to Restatement § 8A, distinguish an "intentional tort" from a "reckless
action" as follows:
1. A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A knows that C,
B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to injure C, but knows that
his act is substantially certain to do so. C is injured by the explosion. A is
subject to liability to C for an intentional tort.
2. On a curve in a narrow highway A.,without any desire to injure B, or belief
that he is substantially certain to do so, recklessly drives his automobile in an
attempt to pass B's car. As a result of this recklessness, A crashes into B's car
injuring B. A is subject to liability to B for his reckless conduct, but is not
liable to B for any intentional tort.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A illus. 1 & 2.
192. Negligence emphasizes risk "as it would be perceived by a reasonable person," not the
defendant's purpose or the certainty required to show intent. DOBBS, supra note 53, at §§ 26,
116.
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The Burger King test focuses on the defendant's purposeful availment or some
equivalent purposeful act, 193 but, for the reasons previously explained, this terminology
should not be understood to refer to a defendant's subjective purpose or desire to cause
injury in the forum. At the very most, it should be understood to refer to the
defendant's deliberately undertaken activities that the defendant knows to a substantial
certainty will have a geographic scope or impact that embraces the forum state. Given
such knowledge, it is fair to require the defendant to anticipate suit in the forum state
with respect to claims arising from those activities, and to take steps to avoid or
ameliorate that risk.
Similarly, the Caldertest, which requires express aiming or targeting of the plaintiff
in intentional tort cases,' 94 should at the most be interpreted to require the defendant to
have committed a tortious act knowing to a substantial certainty that it will have its
impact on the plaintiff in the forum state. Even this requirement goes too far, however,
by confounding the kind of intent necessary to hold the defendant liable to the plaintiff
with the kind of intent that should suffice to subject the defendant to personal
jurisdictionin the forum state. For jurisdictional purposes, the key question should not
concern intent to injure the plaintiff, but the defendant's awareness of the geographic
scope of his activities and their impact. Thus, knowledge to a substantial certainty that
the defendant's activities will have their claimed wrongful impact (including the
creation of an actionable risk of harm) in a particular state should be sufficient to place
the defendant on notice that he may be subjected to suit there if those consequences
ensue. Consider, for example, a defendant that deliberately places a bomb on a train
running from Philadelphia to New York with a timing device set to cause the bomb to
explode upon arrival in Grand Central Station. The fact that the bomb, as a result of
reckless or negligent miscalculation, instead explodes in New Jersey and causes injury
there should be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction in New Jersey even though the
defendant had no desire to cause injury there, and did not know to a substantial
certainty that such injury would occur. The critical factor is that the defendant knew
that the geographic scope of the risk created by his activity was substantially certain to
include New Jersey, as well as Pennsylvania and New York.
Indeed, we submit that this "at the most" interpretation of the Supreme Court's
requirement that the defendant have acted with purpose or intent related to the forum
state itself may require too much. 195 In the previous example, assume that a particularly
unaware defendant, having been a poor student of geography in her academic days, did
not know to a substantial certainty that a bomb placed on a train traveling between
Philadelphia and New York would travel through New Jersey. What difference can that
make? Surely the defendant should be required to be aware of things that reasonable
people in the defendant's position should know, and to take steps to avoid or
ameliorate the risk of harm that they have created. 196 Viewed in this way, the kind of

193. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
194. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
195. Other commentators have critiqued the fact that courts have permitted jurisdiction based
on whether the plaintiff demonstrated "knowledge" or "specific intent" in targeting the specific
forum. See, e.g., Stein, Regulatory Precision,supra note 9, at 423-24.
196. This approach comports with the objective "reasonable man" standard applied in the
law of torts. The Restatement defines a "reasonable man" as a person "exercising those qualities
of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for
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intent relevant to personal jurisdiction analysis may be more appropriately viewed as
consisting of recklessness regarding the geographic
scope of the risk of harm that the
197
defendant's wrongful conduct has created.
This approach would be congruent with the underlying policies identified by the
Supreme Court as relevant to personal jurisdiction analysis. The Court has imposed the
core purposeful availment or express aiming or targeting requirements of BurgerKing
and Calder to ensure that the defendant will be in a position to reasonably anticipate
suit in the forum state. A requirement that the defendant deliberately have engaged in
activities that a reasonable person would anticipate to be substantially certain to have
an impact or create an actionable risk of harm in the forum state should be sufficient to
serve that end. The balance of the other key interests at stake-that of the forum state
in affording a convenient forum to its residents, that of the plaintiff in obtaining relief,
and that of the defendant in avoiding inconvenient litigation-is unaffected by whether
the defendant has acted with actual awareness that the geographic scope of the impact
of his conduct would include the forum state, or only should have been aware that it
would. Some decisions in the Calderand BurgerKing lines implicitly appear to have
recognized this fact, and to have focused on the consequences of which the defendant
98
should have been aware, rather than simply on those of which it was in fact aware.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in Volkswagen and subsequent decisions99
particularly in CalderitseleW
-might be argued to have explicitly rejected just such an
approach to personal jurisdiction, to the extent that it is based on the foreseeable
geographic impact of the defendant's actions, as opposed to a defendant's actual
purpose or awareness of the geographic consequences of his conduct.2 00

In

Volkswagen, the Court rejected the assertion ofpersonal jurisdiction in Oklahoma over
the New York wholesaler and retailer of an automobile, finding that the foreseeability
that the New York purchaser of the automobile might drive it to other states where it
might cause an injury should not subject the defendants to suit in those states. The

the protection of their own interests and the interests of others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 283 cmt. b (1977). Further, the "standard which the community demands must be an

objective and external one, rather than that of the individual judgment, good or bad, of the
particular individual." Id. § 283 cmt. c. "The reasonable person... standard is "very largely but
not entirely objective." DOBBS, supra note 53, at § 118.
197. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAvID G. QUEEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 34, at 213 (5th ed. 1984) (classifying an actor's conduct as reckless
where "the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a
known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow").
198. See supra text accompanying note 90.
199. See Calder,465 U.S. at 789 (stating that the fact that defendants might have foreseen
that their publisher might circulate their article in California where it might have an effect was,
standing alone, insufficient to establish jurisdiction).
200. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-98 (1980). The
federal courts of appeals have applied this principle, finding that foreseeability alone is
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of
Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that foreseeability is not sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A.,
677 F.2d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 1982) (requiring more than foreseeability to exercise jurisdiction
over a Panamanian company in a contract dispute).
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Court stated that "'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 2 0'
But Volkswagen should not be interpreted to make irrelevant an evaluation of what
the defendant should know regarding the geographic scope of the effects of his actions.
The Court itself identified the ultimate touchstone of personal jurisdiction analysis as
whether the "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
reasonablyshould anticipate being haled into court there, 20 2 thus focusing on what
the defendant should anticipate, rather than what it did. The Court's rejection of
jurisdiction in Volkswagen turned on the conclusion that the defendants did not
regularly serve the Oklahoma market "directly or indirectly,, 20 3 and could not
anticipate suit there based on the "unilateral" act of a customer, or the "isolated" and
"fortuitous" circumstance that one of their customers might take a single automobile
that they purchased in New York to another state where it would be involved in an
accident. 204 The Court's focus was to ensure a "degree of predictability" in the legal
system, 205 a concern that should be viewed in objective rather than subjective terms. In
later decisions the Court has emphasized that the focus of its jurisdictional restrictions
based on purpose, and excluding the assertion ofjurisdiction based on foreseeability
alone, is to screen out cases in which the connection of the defendant's2 activities
with
6
the particular jurisdiction is 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated.' 0
Where the impact of the defendant's conduct in the forum state is regular and
predictable, the Court has evidenced considerably more difficulty in determining
whether the purposeful availment component of the Burger King test has been
2 7
satisfied. As previously discussed, in Asahi MetalIndustry Co. v. Superior Court, 0
the Court divided four-four-one on whether the Japanese supplier of valve assemblies,
which were incorporated into tire tubes by a Taiwanese company and subsequently
distributed by that company in California, had purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of doing business in California. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, joined
by three other Justices, would have required something more than the defendant's
awareness that its valve assembly might be swept into the state in the "stream of
commerce" and cause an injury there.20 8 Rather, she argued that Asahi must have
engaged in some act "purposefully directed toward the forum state," such as designing
the product for the market, advertising or providing customer service there, or enlisting
a distributor to serve the state. 209 By contrast, Justice Brennan, joined by three other
Justices, concluded that Asahi's "regular and extensive sales of component parts to a
manufacturer it210knew was making regular sales of the final product in California"
should suffice.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295.
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 295, 298.
Id. at 297.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480 (1985).

207. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).

208. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
209. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion).
210. Id. at 121 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictablecurrents or eddies, but to the
regular and anticipatedflow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail
sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being
marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise.211

Although both opinions appear on their face to focus on a defendant's awareness of
the geographic scope and impact of its activities, Justice O'Connor's approach could
be argued to require some desire or purpose on the part of the defendant to serve the
particular forum state, whereas Justice Brennan's approach is more focused on the
defendant's awareness of the ultimate scope and consequences of its actions, regardless
of any such purpose or intent. This latter approach, in turn, shades into that advocated
by Justice Stevens, who focused on purely objective factors indicating that the
defendant should be on notice that its activities were having significant and predictable
consequences in the forum and should anticipate the possibility of suit there. Justice
Stevens found no "unwavering line" between "'mere awareness' that a component will
212
find its way into the forum State and 'purposeful availment' of the forum's market."
Just as Justice Stevens recognized that no unwavering line divides purpose from
mere awareness, so too no sharp line should be drawn, in personal jurisdiction analysis,
between a defendant's actual awareness and what the defendant should know about the
geographic scope of the impact of his conduct. Ultimately, the question is whether the
defendant should reasonably anticipate suit in the forum, not whether he did so. An
approach predicated solely on a particular defendant's actual awareness of the
geographic scope of his activities and their impact would encourage a "head in the
sand" attitude by persons who should anticipate the possibility of suit in a remote
jurisdiction based on the regular and significant impact of their activities there. It could
also breed time-consuming and inconclusive litigation on a preliminary issue over what
a defendant actually did know, as opposed to what he should have known.
3. Superseding Causes
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's concern that a defendant not be exposed to suit
in a remote jurisdiction based on random, attenuated, or unpredictable events, or the
unilateral acts of third parties that are disconnected from the geographic scope of the
defendant's own activities, is legitimate. The appropriate response to that concern lies
neither in making subjective purpose the sine qua non of personal jurisdiction analysis,
nor in making the foreseeability of wrongful effects in the forum state irrelevant. In this
regard, the extensive consideration given by the law of torts to the question of whether
the intervening acts of a third party should constitute a superseding cause of the
defendant's wrongful conduct that relieves the defendant of substantive responsibility
for its actions again is instructive. In this instance, however, the relevant issue is not
ultimate liability under the substantive law, but rather the scope of geographic
responsibility that a defendant should bear for his actions. In both negligent and
intentional torts, the defendant's actions must be found to be the proximate cause of the

211. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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plaintiff's injuries.21 3 An intervening cause, such as the act of a third party or force of
nature, does not necessarily prevent recovery from the defendant. 2 14 However, an
intervening cause may constitute a superseding cause2 1 5 that relieves the original actor
from responsibility in certain circumstances.216 Courts determine whether an
intervening cause should be deemed a superseding cause through a foreseeability
inquiry. 17 This inquiry focuses on such factors as whether the consequences appear to
be a novel or extraordinary result of the defendant's action, whether it operates
independently of the situation created by the conduct of the original actor, whether the
act of a third party is involved, and, if so, whether that act itself is wrongful, and other
factors, 218 such as the geographic and temporal remoteness of the harm.21 9 The physical

213. Proximate cause and cause in fact are required to prevail in a negligence or intentional
tort action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (2003) (referring to the concept of
proximate cause as "legal cause"); DOBBS, supra note 53, § 180. Although this rule is often
"stated in terms of the actor's negligent conduct," proximate cause is also required for
intentional torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (2003). "The superseding cause
limitation applies to all tort actions, including the intentional torts." Richard W. Wright, The
Grounds andExtent ofLegal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1425, 1478 (2003).
214. An intervening cause is when a defendant creates "risks of harm, but the immediate
trigger of harm is another person or force of nature" and does not bar recovery. DOBBS, supra
note 53, §§ 186, 180; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (2003) (noting that a negligent
actor only needs to "be a legal cause of the harm" not "the" legal cause "as meaning the sole and
even the predominant cause"); Wright, supra note 213, at 1468 ("It is usually stated that, to be
an intervening cause, the conduct or event at issue must have temporally intervened between the
occurrence of the defendant's tortious conduct and the plaintiff's injury.") (emphasis in
original).
215. In general, an intervening cause does not become a superseding cause of a defendant's
negligence if it "reflects the same general kind of risk which rendered the defendant negligent."
DOBBS, supra note 53, § 186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (2003) (defining a
superseding cause as "an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents
the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial
factor in bringing about").
216. If an intervening cause "is the only proximate cause because it is the efficient or
immediate cause, then the intervening cause will be called superseding cause and the [original]
defendant will not be liable." DOBBS, supra note 53, § 186. Wright, supranote 213, at 1468 ("A
superseding cause is an actual cause of the plaintiff's injury that (1) intervened between the
defendant's tortious conduct and the plaintiff's injury, (2) was a necessary (but-for) cause ofthe
plaintiff's injury, and (3) was highly unexpected. The second and third factors are the critical
ones.").
217. DOBBS, supra note 53, §§ 186-87; see also Wright, supra note 213 at 1468 ("The
defendant should not be liable, even though her tortious conduct contributed to the plaintiff's
injury, if the injury occurred only because of the intervention of some highly unexpected
('extraordinary' or 'highly extraordinary') condition that disrupted and radically shifted the flow
of events. On the other hand, there would be little reason (at least as a matter of justice) to
absolve the defendant of liability because of the existence of an intervening cause, no matter
how unexpected the intervention was, if the injury would have occurred as a result of the
defendant's tortious conduct regardless of the intervention.").
218. Several factors are important in determining whether an intervening cause is a
superseding cause. These include whether (1) "its intervention brings about harm different in
kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence"; (2) the
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remoteness of the effects of a defendant's actions does not itselfbar recovery, provided
that they should be readily anticipated by the defendant.220
In the context of the defendant's geographic responsibility for the consequences of
its actions, this kind of proximate cause analysis would screen out remote, attenuated,
episodic, and unpredictable geographic harms that were not reasonable foreseeable by
the defendant. At the same time, it would sustain personal jurisdiction for specific
geographic effects that were the natural and predictable consequences of the
defendant's actions and that the defendant therefore reasonably should have
anticipated. Where the unilateral acts of a consumer over which the defendant has no
control and which he cannot predict, such as the act of the purchaser of an automobile
in driving it to a remote state in Volkswagen, are at issue, an analysis based on
transposition of concepts of proximate and superseding cause-appropriately molded
in light of the policies relevant to the scope of geographic responsibility for the
consequences on one's actions rather than the imposition of substantive liability in
tort-would reject the exercise of jurisdiction. By contrast, in cases such as Asahi,
where the maker of a component part supplies it to an intermediate manufacturer that it
knows or should know will incorporate it into a commercial product that will be sold in
the forum state, generating profits that ultimately redound to the benefit of the
component supplier, the intervening acts of the manufacturer are not random,
attenuated, unusual, or unpredictable. In such circumstances, an approach such as that
of Justice O'Connor in Asahi, which rejects jurisdiction in all cases on the ground that
the maker of the component had not itself taken action directly to market its product in
the forum state, takes too restrictive a view of the scope of geographic responsibility
that the defendant should bear for its actions. Of course, jurisdiction should not be
sustained in such cases in all circumstances. Rather, once the geographic scope of the
consequences appear "extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at
the time of its operation"; (3) "the intervening force is operating independently of any situation
created by the actor's negligence, or on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a
situation"; (4) "the intervening force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to act"; (5)
"the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is wrongful toward the other and
as such subjects the third person to liability to him"; (6) "the degree of culpability of a wrongful
act of a third person which sets the intervening force in motion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 442 (2003).
219. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 180. In determining remoteness in time and space, courts
consider that the greater the distance between the action and the injury, the more likely that
other actions intervened. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Clearly we must so consider, for the greater the distance either in
time or space, the more surely do other causes intervene to affect the result."); Bird v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 86 N.E. 120 (N.Y. 1918) (considering remoteness in time and space).
220. Some courts have found that remoteness in time or space is important in "determining
whether the defendant has been a substantial factor in causing the harm" but that "physical
remoteness should of itself [not] bar recovery." Jacobs v. Martz, 166 N.W.2d 303, 305-06
(Mich. Ct. App. 1968); see also Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624,629 n.6 (Cal. 1986); Osbom v.
City of Whittier, 230 P.2d 132, 136 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (noting that "[p]roximity in point
of time or space ... is of no importance except as it may afford evidence for or against
proximity of causation"); KEETON ET AL., supra note 197, § 43, at 283 (5th ed. 1984) ("The
defendant who sets a bomb which explodes ten years later, or mails a box of poisoned
chocolates from California to Delaware, has caused the result, and should obviously bear the
consequences.").
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impact of its actions that the defendant should anticipate is established, the overarching
due process requirement of the reasonableness of the exercise ofjurisdiction under all
of the circumstances must be satisfied as well. 22 1 The Supreme Court majority in Asahi
appropriately rejected jurisdiction on this ground, rather than because the foundation
purposeful availment requirement was not met.
This analysis may help to explain the result in Calder,in which the Supreme Court
sustained jurisdiction over the individual defendants in California despite their
argument that they were not responsible for the publisher's decision to circulate their
allegedly defamatory article in California, even though they might have foreseen that it
would have its harmful effects there. 222 The Court rejected the contention that the
defendants were like a welder who worked on a boiler in Florida that later exploded in
California on the ground that, unlike the welder, the defendants' acts were expressly
aimed at California where the plaintiff lived and worked. Calder should not be
distinguished from the hypothetical welding case on the basis of the defendants'
subjective purpose or intent, however, nor on the ground that foreseeability alone is not
enough. Rather, in the welding hypothetical, the defendant would have had no reason
to predict that the defective boiler would cause harm in any particular state, and no
reason to predict that his employer's intervening act would send it there. By contrast, in
Calder,the defendants clearly could predict that their defamatory article would be
circulated in California and have its wrongful impact there, in view of the substantial
certainty that their employer would circulate the article there and that their active
participation in the chain of events that predictably led to that result. They had no basis
for arguing that their employer's actions were an extraordinary or unexpected
intervening cause that should relieve them of geographic responsibility for the effects
of their actions.
But what if the welder, although acting negligently rather than intentionally as in
Calder,knew in fact that all of his employer's boilers were sold in California? The
logic of our argument suggests that the defendant's intent or awareness with respect to
the geographic impact of its actions, rather than his intent or awareness in committing
the underlying tort, should control. This conclusion might draw support from the
Supreme Court's decisions involving the conduct of interstate business operations, in
which a foreign defendant that has purposefully directed his activities toward the forum
is subject to jurisdiction there for negligence and strict liability claims, as well as for
intentional torts. Such an argument would draw additional support from Calderitself.
Although courts commonly view that decision as applicable only to intentional torts
targeted at the plaintiff in the forum state, the tort of defamation sometimes imposes
strict liability for utterances that
the defendant had no reason to believe were
223
defamatory towards the plaintiff.
But Calder gives no indication that it was intended to extend so far. In cases
involving purely negligent conduct, it is likely that the intervening acts of the welder's
employer in determining where to circulate the defective boiler would be held to
constitute a superseding cause of the geographic impact of the welder's negligent
conduct. 224 If, on the other hand, the welder had deliberately installed a defective valve

221.
222.
223.
224.

See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
KEETON ET AL., supranote 197, at 808.
See supra text accompanying notes 213-21.
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on a boiler knowing that it would explode when used, and additionally knew or should
have known that the boiler was destined for use in California, no reason is apparent
why the welder should be relieved of geographic responsibility for the consequences of
his actions there.
Of course, this approach inevitably would involve the difficult issues ofjudgment
and uncertainties that infect proximate cause analysis generally. But to assume that
making such ambiguous concepts as "purposeful availment," "express aiming," and
"targeting" the touchstone of personal jurisdiction analysis has eliminated those
uncertainties would be incorrect, as illustrated by the many difficulties courts have
faced in interpreting and applying those concepts in the cases previously reviewed. 225
Those difficulties have been particularly evident as courts have struggled to extend
those tests to new contexts such as informational wrongs and Internet activities to
which they were not addressed. In this respect, the Supreme Court's foundation
decision in InternationalShoe was prescient in its failure to focus on the defendant's
intent, or to adopt a rigid or formulaic approach to minimum contacts analysis. Rather,
the Court recognized the inevitable shades of gray, degrees of responsibility, and issues
ofjudgment that do and must attend the determination of the appropriate geographic
sweep of a state's sovereign power to reach actors located in other states-and the
corresponding geographic scope of responsibility that those actors should bear for their
conduct. In providing guidance on those issues, the Court focused not on intent, but
rather on the nature and quantum of the defendant's actions with respect to the forum
state and the relationship of those actions to the cause of action that was asserted. The
test was not "mechanical or quantitative" or whether the defendant's activities with
respect to the state were "a little more or a little less." 226 Whether due process was
satisfied was said to turn upon "the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to ensure." 227 In light of the difficulty of interpretation and application that they
have created, one wonders whether the Court's more recent efforts to particularize that
test in terms ofprongs, and multiple factors bearing on the satisfaction ofthose prongs,
with predominant emphasis on the defendant's assumed purpose or intent, have
constituted a significant improvement.
4. Consistency with Existing Law
The previous discussion suggests that the foundation requirement of personal
jurisdiction in both interstate business and intentional tort cases is whether the
defendant is or should be aware that the impact of his allegedly wrongful actions is
substantially certain to be felt in the forum state. Of course, that does not mean that the
defendant must be aware that the impact of his actions is in fact wrongful or tortious, or
that the plaintiff must prove his case on the merits in order to establish jurisdiction in
the forum. Rather, the touchstone should be whether the defendant is or should be
aware that his conduct is substantially certain to have the kind of impact or create the
risk of harm asserted by the plaintiff as the basis for its suit within the forum state. 228 If

225.
226.
227.
228.

See supra Part II.
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
Id.
One possible objection to the suggested analysis is that it might allow a plaintiff to
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that threshold requirement is satisfied, the exercise ofjurisdiction would be sustained
unless an intervening cause is held to relieve the defendant of geographic responsibility
for the consequences of his actions under a proximate cause-like analysis as previously
discussed,229 or unless the exercise ofjurisdiction is unreasonable after balancing the
factors that the Supreme Court has identified as bearing on that inquiry. 230 This
approach appears quite consistent with the results courts in both the BurgerKing and
Calder lines have reached.
In cases arising out of a defendant's conduct of interstate business activities, courts
applying the Burger King test have assumed that a defendant who has chosen to
conduct business in a particular forum reasonably may anticipate being sued there on
tort, contract, and other claims arising out of those activities.23 The main difficulty
presented by such cases has been in determining whether the defendant should be
relieved of geographic responsibility for his business operations that have a foreseeable
impact in the forum state where that impact was the result of the intervening act of a
third party, such as a consumer, a wholesaler, or a manufacturer whose products
incorporate a component part made by the defendant. These questions should be
resolved by applying a proximate cause-like analysis to determine whether such
intervening acts are sufficiently random, attenuated, and unpredictable to relieve the
defendant of geographic responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of his acts in a
232
particular state.

"bootstrap" his way to personal jurisdiction over a remote defendant by asserting a legally
frivolous claim and obtaining a default judgment on that basis. The accepted principle that a
default does not admit the legal sufficiency of the complaint, 1OA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL.,

FEDERAL PRACTIE & PROCEDURE § 2688 (3d ed. 1998), coupled with the principle that a

default judgment is always open to collateral attack for lack of personal jurisdiction, id. § 2695,
make it clear that this strategy would not succeed. However, in order to promote the
fundamental "notice" requirement of personal jurisdiction analysis, jurisdiction under the
suggested approach should be sustained only where the legal theory asserted by the plaintiff as
the basis for his action is clearly established as legally viable at the time the defendant's
allegedly wrongful conduct took place.
229. See supraPart III.C.3.
230. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Cent. Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transp. Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 386 (5th Cir.
2003) (applying BurgerKing to exercise personal jurisdiction over a contract claim and stating,
in analyzing the reasonableness factors, that defendant had "fair warning that it could be sued in
Texas for alleged breach of [contract] and for alleged intentional torts arising out of its
performance under" the contract).
232. See supra Part III.C.3. A recent Third Circuit decision applying the BurgerKing test
closely corresponds with our suggested approach. In Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318

F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003), the court rejected personal jurisdiction in New Jersey based on a
Spanish company's allegedly infringing interactive Web site which permitted the purchase of
merchandise "mimicking" that offered by the plaintiff. The court applied the Zippo test for
personal jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court's "purposeful availment" standard,
concluding that the defendant's operation of an interactive Web site "alone" was insufficient
absent additional evidence that the defendant had purposefully directed its activities at New
Jersey customers. Although phrased in terms of "purpose," the key issue for the court was
whether the plaintiff had shown that the defendant was aware that the Web site had resulted in
sales to New Jersey residents. The court concluded that such knowledge was not established in
view of the fact that the Web site was entirely in Spanish, merchandise could be shipped only to
addresses in Spain, and the site was not designed to accommodate U.S. addresses. Id. at 454.
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Tort cases falling into the Calder line are not entirely consistent, but generally
reflect a strong focus on defendant's awareness of the specific geographic fora in
which his conduct may have the impact that provides the basis for the plaintiff's suit.
Cases almost uniformly have rejected the idea that the foreseeable financial impact that
a defendant's wrongful actions may have on a corporate plaintiff in its headquarters
state is sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction there.233 Such a rule would mean that
a corporate plaintiff always could sue any defendant in the plaintiff's headquarters state
no matter where the actual wrongful impact of the defendant's conduct occurred.234
Instead, courts applying Calder correctly have focused on the particular geographic
location or locations where the defendant did anticipate or should reasonably have
anticipated that its conduct would result in an invasion of the interest of the plaintiff
that is the subject of the suit. In Far West Capital,Inc. v. Towne, 235 for example,
personal jurisdiction over Oregon and Nevada defendants in Utah was rejected in a
case involving an alleged breach of contract and interference with contractual relations
related to a project to supply power to a Nevada utility from Nevada geothermal
resources. The plaintiff was a Utah resident, an initial solicitation had occurred there,
and other Utah contacts, such as phone calls, faxes, an escrow account, and defendant's
resident agent, existed.236 Nevertheless, the court, referring to both BurgerKing and
Calder,focused on the fact that the most important negotiations took place in Nevada
and the transaction was centered there.237 As a result, the focal point of the defendant's
wrongful conduct and its wrongful impact were in Nevada, not Utah.238 In Chaiken v.
Two "random" sales solicited by representatives of the plaintiff in an apparent effort to
manufacture jurisdiction were insufficient. The court concluded that defendant "scarcely
recognized" that sales with U.S. residents had been consummated. Id. at 454-55.
233. See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254,263 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining
that "the mere allegation that the plaintiff feels the effect of the defendant's tortious conduct in
the forum because the plaintiff is located there is insufficient to satisfy [the express aiming
requirement of] Calder");ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625-26 (4th Cir.
1997) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction under Calder because even though the plaintiff's
company was headquartered in the forum state, permitting Calder to be satisfied on this basis

would mean that jurisdiction in intentional tort cases would always be appropriate in the
plaintiff's home state, and would be based on a decision of the plaintiff, not the defendant); Far
West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1080 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that there was no
personal jurisdiction under Calder since there was no evidence that defendants' alleged torts
had any connection to Utah beyond the fact that it was plaintiff's corporate domicile);
Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763,773 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that the fact
that the plaintiff had its principal place of business in the forum was a "mere fortuity" and did
not demonstrate that the defendant "expressly aimed its allegedly tortious activities" at the
forum or that the forum "is even the focal point" of defendant's conduct).
234. ESAB Group, Inc., 126 F.3d at 625-27. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Dole FoodCo.
v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002), which sustained jurisdiction in California over a
foreign defendant who allegedly had defamed the plaintiff by emphasizing that the plaintiff
suffered sufficient economic harm resulting from defendants' conduct at its principal place of
business, id.at 1113-14, superficially appears inconsistent with this analysis, but, upon closer

examination, is not. See infra note 250.
235. 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995).
236. Id.at 1073-74.
237. Id.at 1080.

238. Id.; accord Denver Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Design & Bldg. Servs., Inc., 653
N.W.2d 88, 92-93 (S.D. 2002) (rejecting jurisdiction in South Dakota because "[t]he claim for
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VVPublishing Corp.,23 9 the Second Circuit rejected jurisdiction in Massachusetts over
a libel action against an Israeli newspaper with a small circulation in Massachusetts.
The court emphasized that the newspaper had only a small circulation in
Massachusetts, and that the allegedly defamatory article concerned the plaintiffs'
activities in connection with a Jewish terrorist organization while they resided in
Israel. 24 0 The defendant failed Calder'sexpress aiming requirement because its article
was focused on Israeli events and the defendant believed that the plaintiffs had
permanently settled in Israel.2 4' The Court concluded that the defendant had "reason to
believe" that the effects of its article would be felt in Israel, not Massachusetts. 242 In
Revell v. Lidov, 243 the Fifth Circuit rejected jurisdiction in a Texas action against
Columbia University and one of its professors who had posted an allegedly defamatory
article on the university's Web site. Applying the Zippo formulation, the court found
that the Web site was "interactive," but held that jurisdiction was improper because the
article did not refer to plaintiff's Texas activities and was not directed to Texas
readers. 244 The plaintiff's residence in the forum and his suffering of harm there, were
insufficient to establish that Texas was the "focal point" of the article or the harm
suffered. 245 The court required the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's conduct
had a "unique relationship" with the forum. 24 The court noted that the article was
directed at the "entire world" and did not specifically target Texas residents.247 In fact,
the individual defendant's affidavit stated that he did not know the plaintiff was a
forum resident.2 " The court pointed out that "[k]nowledge of the particular forum in
which a potential plaintiff will bear the brunt of the harm forms an essential part of the
Caldertest. '' 249 Although the court's language regarding the focus of the defendant's
conduct and the need for a unique relationship with the forum is arguably inconsistent
with our approach, the court's result conforms with our analysis. Other cases generally
250
consistent with the suggested approach are collected in the footnote
breach and negligence are directly related to the contract which was created, executed and
performed in Colorado").
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

119 F.3d 1018 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1027-29.
Id. at 1028-29.
Id.at 1029.
317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).

244. Id. at 472, 475-76.
245. Id. at 473.
246. Id. at 474.
247. Id. at 475.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. In Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 1998), the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit rejected jurisdiction over an action alleging claims for defamation, invasion of the
right of privacy, and misappropriation and violation of the right of publicity based on the
unauthorized use of a Massachusetts plaintiff's photograph in cigarette advertising in France.
Even though some of the magazines containing the ad were distributed in Massachusetts, the
defendants did not "direct" their activities toward Massachusetts. Id. at 91. The advertisement
contained French text and a French phone number, suggesting that the defendants created it for
a French audience, and the defendants were unaware that magazines containing the ad would
reach Massachusetts. Consistent with Justice Stevens's dicta in Asahi, the court indicated that
the size of distribution of the offending material would help to determine whether the defendant
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had acted with sufficient "intent." Id. at 91. The court's analysis centered around whether the
defendant was or should have been aware that the allegedly wrongful impact of its conduct
would be felt in Massachusetts. Similarly, in Schwarzenegger v. FredMartin Motor Co., 374
F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an Ohio car
dealership's alleged misappropriation of the plaintiff's likeness in an advertisement published
only in Ohio did not satisfy Calder's"express aiming" requirement in the plaintiff's California
action alleging that the unauthorized use of his image violated his right of publicity. The court
found that the defendant's conduct was "expressly aimed" at Ohio, not California, even though
it recognized that the plaintiff might suffer financial harm in California as a result of the
defendant's conduct, and the defendant undoubtedly was or should have been aware that the
plaintiff resided there. Id. at 807. A better ground for rejecting jurisdiction would have been that
the alleged wrongful impact of the defendant's conduct in diminishing the value of the
plaintiff's reputation had occurred in Ohio, not California.
In ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut,Inc., 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997), the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that the defendants were not properly served under South Carolina's
long-arm statute in an action by a South Carolina corporation alleging RICO and state tort
violations arising from the alleged misappropriation of the plaintiff's trade secrets and customer
lists in Florida. The only connection with South Carolina was the fact that the defendants knew
that the Florida scheme, if successful, would result in lost sales by the plaintiff. However, the
defendant had not "targeted" South Carolina, but had focused on customers throughout the
United States and Canada. Id. at 625. The fact that the financial impact of the defendant's
conduct was felt in South Carolina was "too unfocused to justify personal jurisdiction." Id
Although the court did not expressly state that personal jurisdiction should turn on whether the
defendant was or should be aware that the wrongful impact (as opposed to the financial
consequences) of its actions would be felt in a particular state, its analysis in fact focused on the
location of the plaintiff's customers and, consequently, the geographic locus of the wrongful
impact of the defendant's conduct.
By contrast, in PanavisionInternational,L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998),
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained jurisdiction in California over a cyberspace
"pirate" case in which the defendant, a resident of Illinois, had registered the plaintiff's trade
name on the Internet. Although the court relied upon the fact that the defendant, in response to
the plaintiff's cease-and-desist letter, attempted to "extort" money from the plaintiff through
settlement, it also placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the defendant was aware that the
wrongful impact of his conduct would be felt by the plaintiff in California where its principal
place of business was located and where the heart of the motion picture and television industries
was located. Id. at 1322.
In IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998), the court rejected
personal jurisdiction in New Jersey over a German corporation that the plaintiff New Jersey
corporation alleged had tortiously interfered with the sale of the plaintiff's Italian subsidiary to a
competing French corporation. Applying the effects test of Calder, the court stated that most
courts applying Calderto business torts had adopted a "narrow construction." Id. at 261. The
court interpreted previous decisions applying Calderas holding that the "brunt of the harm"
requirement is not satisfied when the tortious injury is to contracts or property not located in the
forum. See id. at 265-66. Again, the court's approach was focused on the defendant's awareness
of the geographic locus of the impact of its conduct on the interest that the law sought to protect.
By contrast, in HarrisRutsky & Co. InsuranceServices, Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d
1122 (9th Cir. 2003), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Calder to sustain
jurisdiction in California over tortious interference claims where the contractual relationship that
a London defendant allegedly had interfered with by its conduct in London was centered in
California. Similarly, in Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1999), the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sustained personal jurisdiction in Texas over a German
attorney for a Texas airline company that had sued him for fraud, breach of contract, and breach
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5. Implications of the Suggested Analysis
a. Jurisdiction does not turn on the primary incidence of the harm
If, as we argue, the defendant's awareness of the geographic locus of the alleged
wrongful impact of his conduct should provide the focal point of personal jurisdiction
analysis, the following question remains: "how much harm, or what proportion of the
overall harm," must be suffered in the forum?25' In Dole Food Co. v. Watts,2 5 2 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggested that language in some cases to the
effect that the "brunt of the harm" must be suffered in the forum was inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,253 but found it
unnecessary to resolve the issue because jurisdiction was proper in either event. Some
recent cases have implied that the defendant's awareness that his conduct might injure
the plaintiff in the forum is not sufficient to satisfy Calder's targeting requirement if
the primary focus and impact of the defendant's conduct lies elsewhere. In Young v.
New Haven Advocate,2 4 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
rejected jurisdiction in Virginia in an action by the warden of a Virginia prison who
alleged that he had been defamed in an article posted on the Internet by Connecticut
newspapers. The court held that the defendants had not posted the articles with the
"manifest intent" of targeting the plaintiff or a Virginia audience. 2 55 The newspapers
256
had minimal or no circulation in Virginia and did not solicit subscribers in Virginia.
None of the reporters traveled to Virginia to write the articles, although they did place
some telephone calls to Virginia.257 Applying its previous decision in ALS Scan,258 the

of fiduciary duty in the course of the attorney's representation of the plaintiff. Even though the
business transaction at issue was, as in IMO, centered in Europe, the court sustained jurisdiction
under Calder because the tortious consequences of the defendant's conduct were felt in Texas.
In particular, the defendant had directed letters, faxes, and phone calls toward the forum which
contained the fraudulent misrepresentations that were at the heart of the lawsuit, and the plaintiff
detrimentally relied on those misrepresentations there. Id. at 212. Likewise, in Dole Food Co. v.
Watts, 303 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained
jurisdiction in California in an action by a corporation having its principal place of business in
California alleging that officers of a foreign division had fraudulently induced it to enter a
disadvantageous transaction. Although much of the court's analysis erroneously focused on the
"metaphysical question of where a corporation suffers economic harm," id. at 1113, the court
also based its decision on the fact that, as a result of the fraud, "Dole managers in California
were induced to approve the injurious transactions." Id. at 1114. Compare Helmer v.
Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting jurisdiction in the District of Columbia
over claims for breach of a contract entered in the District where the performance of the contract
and impact of the breach occurred in Russia, but sustaining jurisdiction over a contract claim
based on failure to repay credit card charges where those charges were billed to an address in the
District and payment arrangements were made there).
251. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002).
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 1112-13.
465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984).
315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 264.

256. Id. at 259-60.
257. Id.at 260.
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court rejected the warden's argument that personal jurisdiction was proper in Virginia
because the defendants knew that the plaintiff was a Virginia resident and his
reputation was harmed there where he lived and worked. 259 The court held that the
plaintiff must show that the defendants intended to target a Virginia audience-a
requirement that was not satisfied because the content of the Web site was "local,"
serving readers in Connecticut by commenting on Connecticut's prison transfer
policy. 260 This approach should be rejected, to the extent that it suggests that some sort
of intent, targeting, or aiming at the forum beyond the defendant's actual or
constructive awareness that the allegedly tortious impact of its conduct is substantially
certain to be felt there is required, or that the primary impact of the defendant's
conduct must lie in the forum. By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers,
Inc. 261 rejecting jurisdiction in a Maryland trademark infringement action based on the
defendant's operation of an allegedly infringing semi-interactive Web site having a
strongly local Chicago area character was correct. That was not because a strongly
local Web site focused on an audience in another state cannot support jurisdiction in a
state where its injurious effects are felt, as the court assumed.262 Rather, it was because,
on the particular facts of the case, the defendant had no reason to believe that any
confusion, dilution, or other adverse effects that trademark law is intended to address
had occurred in Maryland.263
b. Jurisdictional analysis should be claim-specific
An approach focused on the particular forum in which the defendant is or should be
aware that his conduct will invade the protected interest at stake means that
jurisdictional analysis should be claim-specific. That is because the geographic locus of
the harm that the law seeks to prevent may vary depending on the type of claim for
relief that the plaintiff asserts. In Schwarzenegger v. FredMartin Motor Co.,264 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that in applying the Calder effects test,
"[the] 'express aiming' analysis depends, to a significant degree, on the specific type of
tort... at issue." 265 In Remick v. Manfredy,266 the Court of Appeals for the Third
258. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002).
The ALS test allows a state to "exercise judicial power over a person outside of the State when
that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of
engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a
person within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State's courts." Id.
(emphasis added).
259. Young, 315 F.3d at 264.
260. Id.
at 263.
261. 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2003).
262. Id. at 400-01.
263. The only donation received by the defendant from a Maryland resident during the
relevant time period was from the plaintiff's attorney attempting to bolster its case. Id.
Compare
Rio Properties,Inc. v. Rio InternationalInterlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002), where
jurisdiction in Nevada in a trademark infringement action against a Costa Rican entity was
sustained because the defendant, in addition to its operation of a passive Web site, had targeted
the plaintiff's Nevada customers in an advertisement published in Nevada.
264. 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004).
265. Id.
at 807; see also Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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Circuit adopted such a claim-specific approach, sustaining jurisdiction over some
claims where the geographic incidence of the defendant's wrongful conduct would be
felt in the forum, while rejecting jurisdiction over others. The plaintiff was a
Pennsylvania attorney who had been hired by Manfredy and lawyers located in Indiana
and Illinois to negotiate fight contracts for Manfredy. 267 Manfredy later discharged the
plaintiff for failing to adequately represent his interests. 268 The complaint alleged
claims for breach of contract, defamation, misappropriation of image and likeness, and
tortious interference arising from the termination of employment, the defendants'
sending of allegedly defamatory letters to the plaintiff in Pennsylvania, and the posting
of the plaintiffs image on a Web site. 269 The court sustained jurisdiction as to the
breach of contract claim under a totality of the circumstances test apparently derived
from Burger King.270 It noted that the defendant had solicited the contractual
relationship with the plaintiff in Pennsylvania where the services were performed, had
made at least one payment there, and had sent the termination letter there.27' For the
same reasons, jurisdiction over the tortious interference claim was proper 272
in
Pennsylvania because the contractual services interfered with were centered there.
By contrast, the court rejected jurisdiction over the claims for defamation and
misappropriation of image and likeness, applying Calder'stargeting approach. 273 The
court noted that the letters were published throughout the boxing community and were
not expressly focused on Pennsylvania.274 In fact, there was no indication that the letter
was targeted at anyone in Pennsylvania other than the plaintiff.275 Similarly,
the Web
276
site on which the plaintiffs image was posted was accessible worldwide.
For the reasons previously discussed, the court's implication in connection with the
defamation and misappropriation claims that jurisdiction should be rejected even if the
defendant was aware that the wrongful impact of his conduct would be felt in
Pennsylvania, on the ground that the defendant's conduct was not uniquelyfocusedon
Pennsylvania or that the primary impact of the defendant's conduct was felt elsewhere,
should be rejected. However, the court's claim-specific approach, which
simultaneously upheld jurisdiction over the contract-related claims on the apparent
ground that the types of injuries that the law of contracts and tortious interference seek
to prevent took place there, was correct. If personal jurisdiction was lacking over the
remaining tort claims, it should have been because the defendant neither was nor
should have been aware that the allegedly tortious impact of its conduct would be felt
in Pennsylvania, not because it was also (or more strongly) felt elsewhere.277
266. 238 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001).
267. Id. at 252-53.
268. Id. at 253.
269. Id. at 256,260. Remick's claims against Manfredy included "breach of contract and the
tort claims of defamation, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation of image and likeness." Id. at
256. The claims against the law finm included defamation, conspiracy, and tortious interference
with contract. Id. at 257, 263.
270. Id. at 256-57.
271. Id. at256.
272. Id. at 260.
273. Id. at 257-59.
274. Id. at 259.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Cf.Gordy v. DailyNews, 95 F.3d 829, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding jurisdiction
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c. Jurisdictional analysis should turn on the nature of
the legally protected interest at stake
An approach to issues of personal jurisdiction focused on the defendant's actual or
constructive knowledge of the geographic incidence of the harm or risk of harm that his
conduct has caused to the interest asserted by the plaintiff requires careful attention to
the nature of the interests that particular bodies of law seek to protect. In cases
involving informational wrongs and intangible interests, identifying the geographic
locus of the legal invasion at issue, and the defendant's actual or constructive
awareness of that locus, may present considerable difficulty. As discussed further
below, this may be particularly true in cases involving informational wrongs committed
through the omnipresent instrumentality of the Internet. However, that difficulty does
not support rejecting our suggested approach. The necessity to mark out sometimeselusive geographic boundaries and limits is inherent in the territorial approach to issues
of personal jurisdiction and state sovereignty that the Supreme Court has consistently
followed since Pennoyer v. Neff278 The Court's later expansion of the strict presence
of persons or property within the forum state approach taken by Pennoyercontinued to
require that a defendant's conduct establish a sufficient territorial connection with the
forum state to respect limits on state sovereignty and make the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant fundamentally fair.279 No matter what test of personal
jurisdiction is adopted, the same problems of ascribing territorial location to
informational and intangible harms will remain.
Moreover, the difficulty of identifying the geographic locus of the harm to the
plaintiff's protected interests is easily overstated, even where informational harms and
intangible interests are at stake. The law of defamation seeks to protect the plaintiff's
reputational interest, and the states in which the plaintiff possesses a reputation that
might be injured are identifiable, as are the states where the defendant's allegedly
defamatory publications are circulated and read.280 Patent law seeks to protect the
plaintiff's right to exclusive use and enjoyment of the patented process or invention. 28'
The state or states in which an alleged infringer has invaded those rights can be
identified, as can the geographic locus of copyright infringement.28 z Trademark and
over a California defamation action brought by a California resident even though ninety-nine
percent of the defendant's circulation was in New York and less than twenty copies of the
offending newspaper had been distributed in California).
278. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
279. See supra Part I.A.
280. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARLETr, PROSSER, WADE &
ScnwARTz's TORTS 932 (10th ed. 2000) (noting that a plaintiff alleging defamation can only
obtain damages to the extent that he can prove "impairment of reputation and standing in the
community").
281. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL &MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

22 (3d ed. 2003).

282. Patents include a "[p]rocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." Id. at
21. Infringing processes, manufactures, etc., have a geographically identifiable location.
Similarly, in order for a work to be copyrightable, it must be "fixed in a 'tangible medium of
expression."' Id. at 336 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52-53 (1976)). Since every copyright
work is "fixed in a tangible medium," in order to infringe a copyright, the work must be
reproduced or displayed in an identifiable state.
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trade dress law protects nonfunctional names and dress that serve to identify and
distinguish goods and prevent customer confusion. Trademarks are infringed or diluted
when customer confusion is created or when the connection in customers' minds of a
mark with one source is destroyed.283 To establish a trademark infiingement or dilution
claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his trademark was used in connection with
products sold in the market. 284 In such cases, the critical issue under the suggested
analysis would be whether the defendant was or should have been aware that the
plaintiff's mark was being used in the forum state and whether the defendant's mark
was exposed to or accessed by the plaintiffs customers there. 285 The law of unfair
competition seeks to protect the plaintiff's interest in the sale of its products or services
in a competitive market that has not been distorted by the defendant's misleading or
wrongful conduct.286 Again, the geographic area or areas in which such unfair
competition has allegedly taken place can be determined.
The geographic locus of the invasion of other intangible interests may be more
difficult to ascertain. For example, the law of trade secrets seeks to protect the
commercial advantage that the developer of trade secret information derives. Such an
interest may be invaded where one who has misappropriated the secret has used it to
commercial advantage. But a trade secret may equally be misappropriated by one who
seeks no commercial advantage, but simply seeks to destroy its value to the rightful
owner for ideological or noncommercial reasons. 28 7 In such cases, the defendant has
taken the plaintiffs property, but unlike cases involving tangible real or personal
property, the geographic location of the taking is not self-evident. In such cases, courts
applying the suggested approach might adopt common law rules corresponding with
the society's normal expectations that would ascribe a geographic location to trade
secret information at the plaintiffs headquarters or principal place of business, or,
where written or other tangible embodiments of the protected information have been
taken, at the place where that taking occurred.28 8

283. Id. at 625-26.
284. See id. at 572.
285. Thus, the intent or awareness element of personal jurisdiction analysis would be more

demanding than that applicable to the determination of liability. Currently, under federal law,
the Lanham Act dealing with trademark infringement does not require a defendant to have any
knowledge or intent to infringe upon another's trademark. Stein, Regulatory Precision,supra
note 9, at 444 ("[D]efendant may be liable for trademark infringement under § 43(a) even if he
or she innocently used an infringing mark and lacked any intent to confuse consumers as to the
source of the goods." (quoting Island Insteel Sys., Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200, 213 (3d Cir.
2002))); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
286. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997) (defining "unfair competition"
to include "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business ... practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising").
287. See Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).

288. An example of an approach that provides a geographic location for jurisdiction over
Internet activities is the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d) (2000). The ACPA contains in rem jurisdiction provisions that determine that the
registration of a domain name in a jurisdiction constitutes "presence" and allows that forum
jurisdiction over it. See, e.g., Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502
(E.D. Va. 2000) (upholding the ACPA). See also Andrew J. Grotto, Due Process andIn Rem
JurisdictionUnder the Anti-CybersquattingConsumerProtectionAct, 2 COLuM. SCI. & TECH.
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d. Jurisdictional analysis does not turn solely on defendant's in-forum activities
The suggested analysis would also help to resolve an ongoing conflict among the
circuits regarding the required relationship between the defendant's direct contacts
with the forum state and the plaintiff's cause of action. Some circuits applying the
purposeful availment test have concluded that the defendant's in-state contacts must be
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 28 9 Others have held it sufficient that the
defendant's forum-related contacts are the but-for cause of the plaintiff's injuries.2 90
Still others appear to have adopted an intermediate position.2 91The Supreme Court has
yet to resolve the required relationship between the defendant's forum-related contacts
292
and the plaintiff's cause of action to sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
The Third Circuit recently addressed these conflicting currents in Miller Yacht
Sales, Inc. v. Smith. 293 The plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, had negotiated with
defendants to allow them to become exclusive dealers for certain of Miller Yacht's
boats. During the negotiations, defendants visited New Jersey where they obtained a
copy of a Miller Yacht sales brochure containing photographs and floor plans for its
yachts. They also arranged to go to China at Miller Yacht's expense to observe the
manufacture of the yachts and meet Miller's business contacts there. Later, when
negotiations fell through, defendants were alleged to have directed advertisements and
sales solicitations incorporating Miller Yacht's intellectual property into New Jersey in
an effort to sell yachts, as well as to have intentionally interfered with Miller's business
relationships in China. Miller Yacht sued for trade-dress infringement, unfair
competition, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
Applying "traditional personal jurisdiction analysis" 294 under the Burger
King/Volkswagen test, the majority upheld jurisdiction in New Jersey over all of the
claims. In so doing, it declined to follow those courts requiring that the defendant's
contacts with the forum be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Although
declining to decide precisely what type of relationship short of that standard would
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the abstract, the majority found it
sufficient that defendants had communicated with New Jersey to set up their trip to
China and later had misappropriated the photographs and floor plans that they obtained
in New Jersey in an attempt to sell boats in New Jersey. 295 By contrast, the dissenting
judge argued that a strict proximate cause relationship was required to establish the
necessaryjurisdictional connection between the defendants' forum-related contacts and
the plaintiffs' claims. Applying that test, jurisdiction over the tortious interference

L. REv. 1, 5 (2001), http://www.stlr.org/html/volume2/grotto.pdf (expressing support for a
"relaxed minimum contacts standard for in rem jurisdiction as it applies narrowly to the ACPA,
primarily on the basis of a pair of procedural safeguards contained in the in rem provisions").
289. See, e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998).
290. See, e.g., Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1051 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997).
291. See, e.g., Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 99-100 (3d Cir. 2004); see
also id.
at 103-04 (Scirica, J., concurring and dissenting) (reviewing conflicting authorities).
292. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,589 (1991); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984).
293. 384 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2004).
294. Id. at 96 n.2.
295. Id.at 97, 99-101.
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claim was improper because the proximate cause of any interference with plaintiffs'
economic advantage was defendants' conduct
in China or their principal place of
296
business, not their contacts with New Jersey.
Both the majority and the dissent regarded the Calder effects test as a distinct test
for personal jurisdiction, requiring a different jurisdictional analysis. However, the
majority found it unnecessary to apply the effects test because of its conclusion that
jurisdiction was proper under "more traditional" purposeful direction analysis rather
than the "more demanding relatedness requirement of the effects test." 297 By contrast,
application of the effects test to the
the dissent would have remanded for separate
298
interference with economic advantage claim.
The difficulty of determining the required degree of relationship between a
defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's cause of action, as well as the necessity
of applying separate jurisdictional tests to reach potentially inconsistent results, would
be avoided by the approach suggested here. Rather than first examining the defendant's
in-forum activities to determine whether they bore a sufficient proximate cause or other
relationship to the plaintiffs' cause of action, and then separately applying the effects
and targeting analysis of Calder,our approach would apply a unified test under which
the totality of the defendant's activities would be examined to determine whether, as a
result, the defendant should have foreseen that they were substantially certain to give
rise to the impact asserted by the plaintiff as the basis for its claims in the forum state.
insofar as it
Under this analysis, the difficulties posed by the relatedness inquiry,
299
focuses solely on defendants' forum-related contacts, disappear.
6. Application to Internet Activities
For the reasons already discussed, a unique test of personal jurisdiction should not
be adopted for cases involving wrongs committed by means of the Internet. At the
same time, traditional tests, when interpreted in light of a defendant's ambiguously
defined purpose or intent, also are inadequate-both because of their uncertain
meaning in this new context, and because it is unclear which of the various tests should
be applied.
Cases fashioning new tests for personal jurisdiction in Internet cases, or straining at
the meaning of old ones, clearly are correct in one respect. Issues of personal

296. Id. at 107.
at 96 n.2.
297. Id. at 97, 99; see also id.
298. Id. at 108 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
299. Under our suggested standard, the jurisdictional inquiry in Miller Yacht would be easily
resolved in favor of sustaining personal jurisdiction on all of the plaintiffs' claims. The required
degree of "relatedness" to the defendant's in-forum contacts also troubled the California
Supreme Court in Snowney v. Harrah'sEntm 't, Inc., 112 P.3d 28 (Cal. 2005). In holding that
Nevada hotels were subject to jurisdiction in California in an action for fraud and related claims
based on their failure to provide notice of an energy surcharge at the time of reservation, the
court rejected a "proximate cause" or "substantive relevance" test in favor of a broader
"substantial connection" test applied in previous decisions. Id.
at 44. However, the outcome of
the case was consistent with the test suggested here because the court relied centrally on the fact
that the impact of the defendant's misrepresentations was felt by California residents in
California. Id.
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jurisdiction are uniquely difficult in such a setting because of the special characteristics
of the Internet itself. Most notably, information posted on the Internet is accessible by
anyone, anywhere, and at any time, and such access takes place by virtue of the
intervening acts of computer users, rather than those of the information posting party
alone. One approach to this unique attribute would be to conclude that, having
deliberately chosen to use a medium that may lead his wrongful conduct to cause harm
anywhere, the Internet poster should be held to be on notice that he may be sued for
such harm in anyjurisdiction where access and consequent harm results.3 ° ° Perhaps the
single most outstanding characteristic of cases considering issues of personal
jurisdiction in this setting is their rejection of such an approach. 30 1 Even though a
defendant might be said to be on notice of the possibility of suit anywhere in such
cases, the courts instead have required that the defendant in Internet cases have
established some unique connection with the particular forum state before being
subjected to. suit there. 30 2 Such a requirement for geographic particularity seems
implicit in both the Burger King and Calder line of cases. On policy grounds, one
might note the extreme deterrent to socially desirable Internet activity that would be
presented by an approach subjecting any Internet poster to suit anywhere that some
person might claim that its legally protected interests have been invaded.30 3 Expanding
the geographic responsibility of an Internet poster for the effects of its actions to such a
degree would make the notice component of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence vacuous, would raise prospects of severe unfairness to defendants, and
would sweep beyond what is necessary to protect the legitimate sovereign interests of
the states.
A cautionary note is in order, however. The difficulty in Internet cases is not that
access to the wrongful posting occurs by means of the unilateral act of a third party. It
is true that the intervening act of another is involved, but the likelihood of such an act
is the intended (in the sense that it is substantially certain to result), natural, and
entirely foreseeable result of the posting itself A proximate cause-based analysis
would not relieve the defendant of geographic responsibility for the effects of his
posting merely because the harm did not occur until a third party had accessed the
information in question, any more than the manufacturer of a product would be
relieved of geographic responsibility for injuries to consumers of its product simply
because those injuries would not have occurred unless the injured consumers
unilaterally had decided to accept the manufacturer's offer of purchase and use.

300. See Leif Swedlow, Three Paradigmsof Presence:A Solutionfor PersonalJurisdiction
on the Internet, 22 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 337, 370 (1997) (describing this as the "spider web"
approach to personal jurisdiction on the Internet); Richard Philip Rollo, The Morassoflnternet
PersonalJurisdiction:It is Time for a ParadigmShift, 51 FLA. L. REv. 667, 679 (1999).
301. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,420 (9th Cir. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co.
v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v.
King, 937 F. Supp. 295,301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d2, 10 (Cal.
2002). But see Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Sys.,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
302. See supra note 301.
303. See Stein, Regulatory Precision,supra note 9, at 453.
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Nor is the central difficulty in Internet cases created by the fact that a defendant has
undertaken conduct that might subject itself to jurisdiction everywhere, rather than only
in one or a few states. A tortfeasor who mails a thousand bombs to recipients in one
state, and one to recipients in each of the other forty-nine states, should not be relieved
from geographic responsibility for the consequences of his actions in each of those
states simply because he is subject to suit everywhere, or because his conduct has a
uniquely intensive relationship with a single state. The problem in Internet cases is not
that the defendant is potentially subject to suit everywhere, but that he is potentially
subject to suit anywhere, without having any particular reason to know where that
might be. This lack of predictability and geographically specific notice lies at the heart
of the difficulties that the courts have experienced in applying traditional jurisdictional
concepts in cases in which the instrument of wrongdoing is an Internet posting. The
case of the Internet posting is more analogous to one in which a defendant throws a
bottle containing poisonous gas into the ocean, with awareness that it may cause injury
to someone, somewhere, if it is found and opened someday.
This difficulty remains even if the issue is, as we suggest that it should be, whether
the defendant should be aware the harm or risk of harm caused by his conduct is
substantially certain to result in the forum state, rather than whether he is in fact aware
that it will. No easy means typically exist to determine the precise geographic
jurisdiction in which Internet postings are accessed by remote users unless the sites
themselves request and obtain that information. This fact no doubt underlies the
conclusion of Zippo and cases adopting its reasoning that posting information on a
passive Web site is not sufficient to subject the poster to jurisdiction in a remote state
where it may be accessed. The Zippo formulation is inadequate in this regard, however,
because in some cases involving purely passive Web sites, the very nature of the
posting, or additional facts of which the defendant is or should be aware will provide
the defendant with the required geographically specific notice that its conduct will have
its claimed wrongful impact in a particular forum state.
Suppose the defamatory article in Calder,for example, had been posted only on a
passive Web site, rather than published in California through circulation of the
National Enquirerthere. If defendants were (or should have been) aware that their
Web site was being accessed by California readers, the result should have been the
same. The critical difficulty in such cases lies in determining whether the defendants
were on notice that their posting would be or had been accessed in the forum. Where
only passive Internet activity is involved, actual or constructive awareness will not
exist unless the defendant is placed on notice of such access by other means, such as a
cease-and-desist letter, 304 independent reports, or other facts. This helps to explain why
Zippo recognized an intermediate category of cases for information posted on
interactive Web sites. Where such interaction is possible, information gained by the
poster by means of that interaction may establish that it is or should be aware that the
wrongful effects of its conduct are being felt in the forum state. Where there are no
additional facts providing such notice, then perhaps Zippo can be argued to be correct.
But where they do exist, Zippo surely is wrong, regardless of the passive nature of the
defendant's Web site.

304. This is not to say that a cease-and-desist letter alone should subject a defendant to
personal jurisdiction in the home state of the sender. See Part III.C.7.
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But what if the publication in Calderhad been only by means of a passive Web site,
and there were no additional facts placing the defendant on notice that the site would
be accessed by California readers so as to damage the plaintiff's reputation there?
Would subjecting the defendant to personal jurisdiction in California cross the
forbidden line by subjecting the defendant to suit anywhere for the effects of its
Internet postings? This is a difficult question that might reasonably be resolved either
way. It is true that no easy means exist for a defendant in such a case to determine
whether its posting has been accessed, or with what frequency, in a particular state. But
the number of hits experienced by a Web site might be determined with some effort,
and this perhaps should be required in circumstances such as Calder,where the posting
is part of an ongoing commercial activity rather than an isolated noncommercial event
and where the defamatory character of the posting is apparent. If a defamatory Web
site resembling the magazine article in Calderwere experiencing a substantial number
of hits, it would perhaps not be unreasonable to require the defendant to assume that
they are geographically dispersed, and that they will cause injury to the plaintiff in her
home state, where she resides and where her activities and reputation are centered, thus
placing a duty of reasonable inquiry upon the defendant in such circumstances. Just as
due process requires a plaintiff, under Mullane v. CentralHanoverBank,30 5 to make a
reasonable ex post effort to notify the defendant of the action when it is commenced,
due process might be held to require, in limited circumstances, an ex ante duty of
reasonable inquiry on a prospective defendant to determine the geographic scope of the
impact of its activities. The scope of that duty would vary depending on such factors as
the allegedly tortious character of the posting, 30 6 the volume, continuity and duration of
the activities in question, their commercial or noncommercial nature, and the evolution
and availability of technology providing a cost-effective means of obtaining the
relevant information.307 Of course, where information is gained on an interactive Web
site that places the defendant on notice that access and injury is occurring in the forum
state, or where the defendant is conducting business over the Web site with residents of
California or some other particular state, the result would follow as a matter of course.
But the ultimate question in such cases is not whether the case falls into one of Zippo's
three categories, but whether, under all of the circumstances, the defendant is or should
be aware that the claimed wrongful impact of its Internet posting is substantially certain
to be felt in the forum state.308

305. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
306. Thus, a duty of inquiry might be imposed where intentionally tortious wrongs are
involved, but not where claims of negligence or strict liability are at issue.
307. See Stein, Regulatory Precision,supra note 9, at 452 (stating that "new technologies
are emerging that will pinpoint the geographic location of [I]ntemet users").
308. This approach would help to explain, for example, the divergent results in the Cybersell
and Bancroft& Masters cases previously discussed. See supra note 83. In the former case, the
record contained no indication that anyone other than the plaintiff had ever accessed Florida
Cybersell's Web site in Arizona, making any claim that the alleged trademark infringement by
the Florida defendant's Web site had its geographic impact there implausible. By contrast, in
Bancroft & Masters, the Georgia defendant had deliberately attempted to divest a California
company of its valuable domain name, a deprivation of property whose effects the defendant

should have ascribed to the plaintiff's home state. Similarly, in Bensusan RestaurantCorp. v.
King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit held that New York's long arm statute
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7. Litigation Threats and Declaratory Judgment Actions
An approach to issues of personal jurisdiction focused on a defendant's actual or
constructive knowledge of the geographic scope ofthe effects ofhis allegedly wrongful
activities also would assist in determining the jurisdictional significance that should be
ascribed to cease-and-desist letters and other litigation threats and in identifying the
fora in which actions seeking declaratory judgments of legality may be maintained.
Cease-and-desist letters may play more than one j urisdictional role. When sent by a
plaintiff to an alleged infringer or wrongdoer in another state, they serve to place the
recipient on notice that it allegedly is causing injury to a plaintiff headquartered in a
particular location. This fact in itself, however, should not be sufficient to subject the
defendant to personal jurisdiction in the home state of the sender. As previously
discussed, a corporation may sufferfinancialharm at its headquarters that is the result
of the wrongful impact of the defendant's activities elsewhere. 309 For example, in
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,310 Cybersell Arizona sent an e-mail to Cybersell
311
Florida claiming that Cybersell Florida's passive Web site infiinged its service mark.
This may have placed Cybersell Florida on notice that the plaintiff was headquartered
in Arizona, but did nothing to suggest that the Web site had any direct impact in
Arizona. In fact, the record contained no indication that anyone other than the plaintiff
had ever accessed the defendant's Web site in Arizona.
Beyond placing (or failing to place) the defendant on notice ofthe geographic scope
of the impact of his allegedly wrongful activities, a cease-and-desist letter or other
litigation threat itself may create the wrongful impact that the suit seeks to remedy or
prevent. Thus, in Bancrofi & Masters,Inc. v. Augusta National,Inc.,312 the Georgia
defendant sent a letter, challenging the plaintiff California computer service company's
use of a domain name, to NSI, the Virginia company that had registered the allegedly
infringing name. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained jurisdiction over
the Georgia defendant in the plaintiff's California action seeking a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement. 313 That holding was correct because the defendant was
or should have been on notice that the allegedly wrongful impact of its activities in
threatening the plaintiff's continued use of its domain name would be felt by the
plaintiff in California where it carried on its business operations. The fact that the letter
was sent to Virginia rather than California was irrelevant. It was the geographic
locus
31 4
of the impact of the letter that mattered, not the address of its recipient.

was not satisfied in an action by the owner of New York's famous Blue Note jazz club against a
Missouri cabaret of the same name alleging unfair competition and trademark dilution by means
of the cabaret's Web site. The result under the due process clause should have been the same.
There was no indication that any New York consumer had accessed the site, and any confusion
or dilution of plaintiff's mark in the eyes of Missouri customers of the cabaret would have
occurred in Missouri, not New York.
309. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
supranotes 233-35 and accompanying text.
310. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
311. Id. at 416; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
312. 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
313. 223 F.3d at 1085.
314. Accord Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Amana
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The Federal Circuit has thoroughly explored the significance of cease-and-desist
letters and other litigation threats in a series of decisions that, on first impression,
might be thought to be inconsistent with predicating jurisdictional analysis on
defendant's awareness of geographic locus of the claimed wrongful impact of its
conduct. In particular, that court has repeatedly held that a patentee's sending of ceaseand-desist letters or other litigation threats to the operating headquarters of an alleged
patent infringer cannot alone support the exercise of personal jurisdiction in an action
by the alleged infringer in that state seeking a declaration of invalidity and/or
noninfringement. 315 Rather, the court has required some additional conduct, such as the
patentee's own efforts to exploit the market in that state by licensing a local
manufacturer or316sales agent, or by entering a licensing agreement with the alleged
infringer itself.
At first blush, this doctrine appears inconsistent with the analysis advocated here.
The very wrongful impact of the litigation threat that the declaratoryjudgment remedy
was designed to avoid is the interference with the plaintiff's right to continue to
manufacture the allegedly infringing product without fear of incurring cumulating and
potentially ruinous penalties. This is particularly the case if it is ultimately determined
that the plaintiff has willfully infringed the defendant's patent, incurring liability for
treble damages and attorneys' fees. 317 This is the harm that the defendant's threat,
directed specifically into the forum, has created and that the declaratory judgment
remedy is designed to prevent. Thus, the defendant's cease-and-desist letter is the
instrument of the very harm that is the subject ofthe lawsuit, and the geographic scope
of its impact not only should have been, but was in fact known by the defendant. In the
usual case, the very ground for a declaration of rights is that the defendant has
of his patent rights by preventing lawful
improperly attempted to expand the scope
318
activities in the plaintiff's home state.
Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
315. See, e.g., Electronics for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that
defendant's letters warning infringement and follow-up calls regarding the letters did not
support an exercise of personal jurisdiction); Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1458 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (pointing out that the Federal Circuit has held "that sending infringement letters, without
more activity in a forum state, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements ofdue process"); Akro
Corp., 45 F.3d at 1548, 1549; see also Cascade Corp. v. Hiab-Foco AB, 619 F.2d 36, 36-38
(9th Cir. 1980) (affirming denial of personal jurisdiction based on a letter by Swedish defendant
alleging that Oregon plaintiff was infringing the defendant's patent); Lawrence D. Graham, The
PersonalJurisdictionEffect ofNotifications ofInfringement, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 858, 860-61 (1996) (stating that "[the district court] cases are legion holding that an
infringement warning letter sent into a forum state, without more, does not create personal
jurisdiction").
316. See, e.g., Inamed Corp., 249 F.3d at 1361; Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc.,
142 F.3d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1998); GeneticImplant Sys., Inc., 123 F.3d at 1458;Akro Corp.,
45 F.3d at 1546. The court has held that mere attempts to solicit a licensing agreement with the
infringer, however, are insufficient "additional" conduct to support the exercise ofjurisdiction.
See Hildebrand,279 F.3d at 1356; Red Wing Shoe Co., 148 F.3d at 1361.
317. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-85 (2000); Inamed Corp., 249 F.3d at 1361.
318. The Federal Circuit's rule is doubly objectionable because the additional activities that
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In more recent decisions, however, the Federal Circuit has explained its treatment of
litigation threats in the declaratory judgment context in terms entirely consistent with
3 19
the approach advocated here. In Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt,Inc.,
the court stated that in such actions where
a patentee casts its net of cease-and-desist letters too widely and entangles some
non-infringing products, a plaintiff may have little recourse other than a
declaratory judgment action to disentangle its non-infringing business. In those
instances, the cease-and-desist letters are the
cause ofthe entanglement and at least
32
partially give rise to the plaintiff's action. 0
The court has justified its rule, not because the defendant has failed to satisfy the
purposeful availment requirement of personal jurisdiction analysis with respect to the
forum, but because in patent cases, the exercise ofjurisdiction in the home forum of the
declaratory judgment plaintiff does not comport with the second due process
requirement that the exercise ofjurisdiction
be consistent with fair play and substantial
32 1
justice under all of the circumstances.

it has held to be sufficient to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction, such as the patentee's own
exploitation of the patent by granting licenses or employing sales agents in the forum, logically
are unrelated to the harm that they have inflicted. The harm at issue does not arise from the fact
that the defendant or others are exploiting the market in the forum, but rather from the fact that
the declaratory judgment plaintiff has been threatened with onerous penalties by doing so itself.
The incoherence of Federal Circuit doctrine on this issue has become even more apparent in
light of the insignificance of the "additional" conduct, beyond litigation threats, that it has held
to be sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction, which has sometimes amounted to no
more than "enhanced" threats and attempts to solicit the entry of a licensing agreement that the
same court has held to be insufficient in other contexts. See Electronicsfor Imaging,Inc., 340
F.3d at 1351 (finding "other activities" such as hiring a lawyer in forum and calling and visiting
plaintiff's facility in California to demonstrate patented technology and to seek a licensing
agreement sufficient for personal jurisdiction).
319. 148 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
320. Id.
at 1360.
321. Id In Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Industries,Inc., 326 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the
Federal Circuit further explained that its "litigation threat" doctrine should be confined to the
patent field. The court sustained jurisdiction over an action in an Iowa plaintiff's home forum
where the plaintiff sought a declaration invalidating an injunction that the defendants had
threatened to enforce there against the plaintiff to protect their trade secrets. Applying Calder,
the court concluded that the defendants had "expressly aimed" their conduct at Iowa because
they knew that their activities would have their allegedly wrongful effects there. "Indeed, there
would appear to be no other purpose in sending the injunction to Silent Drive than inhibiting
Silent Drive from producing the MAXLE .... Id. at 1204. The patent litigation threat doctrine
was distinguished on the ground that
[I]n this Circuit, we have repeatedly held that the sending of infringement letters
would satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of due process except for policy
considerations unique to the patent context ....

The patent system has national

application. If infringement letters created jurisdiction, the patentee could be haled
into court anywhere the letters were sent. No such countervailing policy exists
with regard to state court injunctions, which are designed to operate primarily in
the [rendering] forum.
Id at 1206 (emphasis added).
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8. Testing Applications
To illustrate our approach, we return to the divided opinions in Yahoo! Inc. v. La
Ligue CongreRacisme et L 'Antisemitisme,32232
and Pavlovich v. SuperiorCourt,323 with
324
which we began. In Yahoo!, the view of the dissent was correct. Defendants had
obtained a French court order that specifically required Yahoo! to take action altering
its Web server in California to prevent access by French citizens to Nazi-related
materials. The defendants were clearly aware that their conduct was substantially
certain to have a "powerful and potentially devastating impact" claimed to violate
Yahoo!'s First Amendment rights in California.325 It was that wrongful impact that was
the subject of Yahoo!'s California declaratory judgment action. The majority
concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction because defendants were allegedly "within
their rights' 3 26 in bringing the French action, and therefore had not committed wrongful
conduct aimed at Yahoo!. This conclusion was both incorrect and misleading. The very
issue in the case was whether defendants' conduct violated plaintiff's First Amendment
rights. If the order violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights, as claimed, its harmful
effects were felt in California. Similarly, it was irrelevant that the French defendants
had not yet elected to enforce their French judgment in the United States, because the
threat of accumulating penalties for failing to comply with the judgment in itself
created the forbidden First Amendment impact that plaintiffs declaratory judgment
action sought to prevent.
Pavlovich presents a more difficult question. The plaintiff in Pavlovich was a
California-based licensing entity created by the motion picture and DVD industries to
license technology that those industries had developed to prevent unauthorized copying
and playback of motion pictures reproduced on DVDs.327 The licensing entity alleged
that the Texas defendant's posting of source code on defendant's passive Web site
should be enjoined as a misappropriation of the licensing entity's trade secrets. 328 As
previously discussed, a bare majority of the California Supreme Court rejected
jurisdiction.329
If our suggested approach to issues of personal jurisdiction were adopted, the
central inquiry would be whether the defendant was aware, or should have been aware,
that the impact of his deliberate posting of the disputed technology on his Web site
asserted by the plaintiffto be wrongful was substantially certain to occur in California.
Viewed in this light, the majority could be argued to have reached the correct result,
although the matter is not free from doubt. To the extent the plaintiffs
misappropriation claim was interpreted as seeking to prevent the defendant from
misappropriating the licensor's property interest in the exclusive use and enjoyment of
its trade secret technology, jurisdiction in California should have been sustained only if
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324.
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326.
327.
328.
329.

379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
58 P.3d 2 (2002).
See supra notes 2 and 5 and accompanying text.
Yahoo!Inc., 379 F.3d at 1134.
Id. at 1125-26.
Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 2; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 2.
Id.
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the property itself was located there. As previously discussed, in cases involving
intangible property, this would suggest that the defendant's awareness that the principal
place of business of the property's owner (in this case, the licensor) was in California
would be required-a requirement not satisfied in Pavlovich.33 °
If the misappropriation claim were viewed more broadly as seeking to protect the
interest of the motion picture and DVD industries in preventing unauthorized playback
and copying of copyrighted motion pictures, the case for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction also would be doubtful, but not precisely for the reasons asserted by the
majority. The fact that the claims of a licensor for misappropriation of its trade secrets
were at issue rather than those of motion picture producersor licensees for unlawful
copying and playback 331 should not have been determinative, because jurisdictional
analysis should not require knowledge of the precise identity of the particular plaintiff
332
that might assert claims arising out of a defendant's contacts with the state.
Moreover, the injuries that might have been asserted by the motion picture and DVD
industries were the logical corollaries of the injuries asserted by their licensing agent to
its trade secret technology. Any damage to the value of the technology was entirely
derivative from ultimate injury to the interests of those who used it to protect their
rights to reproduce and play copyrighted motion pictures. Indeed, the technology at
issue had been jointly developed by the motion
picture and DVD industries, which had
333
created the plaintiff as their licensing agent.
Nevertheless, a requirement that the defendant know or should be on notice that the
impact of his actions providing the basis for the plaintiff's suit was substantially certain
to result in the forum state might lead to the same result for other reasons. In particular,
there was no evidence that any California user had ever accessed the defendant's Web
site, let alone that any had used the plaintiff's technology to illegally playback or
reproduce copyrighted motion pictures. 334 Even if there had been, the result would
have been caused, not simply by the decision of such consumers to access the
defendant's Web site, but by their additional, unilateral decision to engage in the
unlawful conduct at issue. A proximate cause-based analysis to questions of
intervening cause might well relieve the defendant of geographic responsibility for
foreseeable harms that were the result of the independently unlawful decisions of third
parties.335
Perhaps the result would have been different if the record had shown widespread
access followed by unauthorized playback and copying in California, of which the
defendant had been placed on fair notice. In such circumstances, the defendant could
no longer claim that he neither was nor should have been aware of the effects of his
conduct in California, or that the actions of third parties were not the normal, expected,
and foreseeable consequences of its actions. But that was not the case before the court.
That is not to say that the correct result in Pavlovich was obvious. It was not, as
evidenced by the close division of the court and the strong arguments advanced on both
sides.
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Seeid. at 10-13.
See supra Part III.C. 1.
Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 14 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 12.
See supra Part III.C.3.
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CONCLUSION

It is time for the Supreme Court to revisit the subject of personal jurisdiction and
minimum contacts analysis for the purpose of clarifying the meaning and relationship
of its purposeful availment and express aiming tests. The Court also should provide
much-needed guidance on the application of jurisdictional analysis in the modem
context of wrongful conduct having potentially widespread effects caused by the
transmission of information over the Internet or by other means.
We suggest that the Court should adopt a unified approach to personal jurisdiction
analysis which turns primarily on whether the defendant objectively should be held to
be on notice that his conduct was substantially certain to have the impact claimed by
the plaintiff to be wrongful in the forum state. If so, jurisdiction would be sustained in
an action based on that harm when it ensued unless the defendant could demonstrate
that he should be relieved of geographic responsibility for the consequences of his
actions under a proximate cause-like analysis, or that the exercise ofjurisdiction would
be unreasonable when balancing the factors that the Supreme Court has identified as
bearing on that inquiry.
No single test for personal jurisdiction in cases involving widespread informational
wrongs and intangible injuries will make difficult decisions easy or reduce questions of
personal jurisdiction to a formula. However, the suggested approach at least removes
the focus from elusive and ambiguous questions of purpose or intent. It adheres closely
to the ultimate issue of personal jurisdiction identified by the Supreme Court, which is
whether the defendant reasonably should anticipate being haled into court in the forum
state as a result of the effects of his actions there. It also applies to all types of cases,
whether they involve invasions of tangible or intangible interests protected by statute
or by the common law, and whether they involve traditional harms committed by
traditional means or informational injuries committed by means of the omnipresent
Internet.

